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Wi11iam Chaloupka

Family farming had been an integral component of United
States agricultural policy from the Revolutionary period
through the latter part of the twentieth century. The role
of the U,S, government increased tremendously following the
Great Depression. However. the family farm began to be
replaced by industrial agribusiness by the late 1370s,
In 1981 the Department of Agriculture published a report
stating that government policies v/ould have to be revamped
in order to reverse the trend tov/ards industrial
agribusiness. By the end of the 1980s it had become
apparent that family farming occupied a diminished role in
overall agricultural production. Thus, a choice had been
made to replace family farms with industrial agribusiness as
the major component in terms of overall U.S. agricultural
production
The 199 5 farm bill made tremendous changes in U.S. farm
policy. The stated intent is to end government involvement
in agricultural policy. There are many implications
associated with this action. The transition from family
farming to industrial agribusiness has led to tremendous
concentration in both production and marketing.
Additionally, agribusiness farming practices have far
greater ecological impacts than the methods employed by
family farmers,
As a result of these developments at the federal level,
state governments, and elements in the private sector, have
intervened. Consequently, there have been attempts to
bolster opportunities for potential family farmers.
However, entry into farming still requires an enormous
amount of capital. This is a situation that is quite a
contrast to the predicament faced by farmers of previous
generat ions.
Family farmers, and the opportunity to be one, have become
almost non-existent. This development ushers in a new era
in agriculture. Many of the consequences have been
predicted, and others will evolve as the end of government
involvement in agriculture moves closer. Regardless, for
present and future generations, a freedom has been lost
which dates back to the Revolutionary Period, the freedom to
farm,
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Historians tell us that when Thomas Jefferson penned
the words ''life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,''
(Brodie 1974, p.122) he had in mind a nation of farmerartisans ov/ning land and profiting from it in an environment
that af forded economic oppor tunity to the common man and not
just the landed gentry,

Jefferson believed that America was

best represented as a country of yeoman farmers.

''Those

who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if
ever he had a chosen people'' (Ibid, p.156),

Jefferson felt

that it was in the best interests of democracy for citizens
to be able to obtain farmland.

Throughout Jefferson's time,

one of his great concerns v/as how this issue v/ould be
handled in the future (Ibid, p.116).
By the latter part of the twentieth century the federal
government had become heavily involved in agricultural
policy,

This thesis examines U.S. agricultural policy

regarding the family farm during the 1980s and 1990s,

The

point of this project is to study the policy choices that
were made and examine the ramifications of these choices, as
it relates to the family farm.

Furthermore, this study

explores the choices that were made that ultimately spelled
doom for the family farm.
The idea that the Government has encouraged the notion
of small independent farmers can be traced back to the
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revolutionary era.

From the Ordinance of 1787 through the

Homestead Act of 1863 and culminating in the Reclamation Act
of 1902. the principal federal role was to make land easily
accessible to would-be farmers.

Throughout this period, the

policy of the nation v/as more or less well-understood:
disperse publicly ov/ned lands to small and modest-sized
landov/ners who vrould operate the nation's farms as yeoman
farmers-oVi'ner-operators (Strange 1988, p,14),

As a result,

the United States accomplished the largest transfer of
national resources to the common citizens the v/orld has ever
known f Farm .Journal 1995, p,32J.
The Great Depression was responsible for expanding the
role of the federal government in agricultural policy.

In

1933, direct government intervention in agricultural markets
was accomplished v^ith the passage of the Agriculture
Adjustment Act,

Through the "Triple A,'' as it is

sometimes called, the government sought to help farmers
survive through difficult times (Kilborn 1984, p.23[A];t.
The passage of the Act benefited family farms in a new
manner because, as one scholar of the period puts it, "an
overwhelming majority of the country's six million farms
were still family operations....

A central ambition in the

Roosevelt program was to keep as many families on the land
as possible" (Worster 1979, p.155).
Follov/ing the 1930s, farm sizes increased and ov/nership
concentrated in fev/er hands.

Through the 1970s the majority

of farms were ov/ned and operated by family farmers,

In
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1978, non-family farms accounted for only 7 percent of total
agricultural sales (Krause 1983. p.22).

However, a mere

decade later, over half the food in the U.S. was produced on
4 percent of non-family farms (Strange 1988, p.41),
This transition from family farming to industrial
agribusiness occurred in a decade.

A 1981 United States

Department of Agriculture (USDA) report, entitled A Time to
Choose. predicted such a transformation.

It offered

direction to policymakers v/ho v/ere to decide the future of
American agriculture.
It has become increasingly evident that
the gains to the Nation that remain to
be captured from the continued shift to
larger- and larger farming operations have
become smaller over time. We have passed
the point where any net gain to society
can be claimed from policies that
encourage large farms to become larger
(U.S,D,A, 1981,p,142).
At the same time, several studies demonstrated
v/idespread public support for the concept of the family
farm.

According to a Lou Harris poll taken in the late

1970s, the public's preference was for a ''country which has
a relatively large number of small farms,''

Significantly,

there is a broad-based consensus on this issue, with strong
support for the family farm in evidence in every region of
the country and in every significant demographic subgroup of
the population'' (U.S.D.A, 1981, p.16).
Approximately a decade later, another nationv/ide surve-y
showed continued support for family farming.

The authors of

this study operated from the premise that "because
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agricultural policies represent significant cost to the
consumers and taxpayers, the issue was hov/ far the public
was willing to support special policies to save the family
farm'' (Epperson, Jordan, and Variyam 1990. p,257).

Nearly

53 percent of the public thought saving the family farm was
more important than obtaining greater efficiency in food
production.

Only 26.3 percent stated a preference for

greater efficiency

Over 57 percent thought that the

government should have a special policy to preserve family
farms (Ibid, p.259).
It appears that government policy, at least until the
late 1970s, 'was in agreement with public sentiment,

Yet in

1994 it was predicted that by the year 2010 only 360.000
farms would account for four-fifths of farm output.
Additionally, the operators and families on those farms
v/ould account for only 0.5 percent of the nation's
population (Tweeten 1994, p,24[C]),

This situation paints a

picture that is quite a contrast to the Jeffersonian vision
of American agriculture,

Thus the question becomes, hov/ did

agriculture policy change so dramatically despite a public
preference for family farms and, at the same time, against
the recommendations of the government's own experts v/ho
stated in A Time to Choose that it seemed fairly certain
that the (then) future economic climate, combined with a
continuation of past policies and programs, would continue,
and even accelerate, the shift to large and super-large
farms.

Therefore, the study concluded, unless policies and
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programs are changed so that they counter, instead of
reinforce and accelerate the trends tov/ards ever-larger
farming operations, the result will be a few large farms
controlling food production (U.S.D.A 1981, p,142).
Chapter Two begins the process of explaining this
situation,

However. before turning to that chapter, it

v/ould be useful to define a number of the terms used in this
thesis.

Perhaps the most di f ficult and confusing problem

'ithin this thesis, and agricultural policy, is to render-

Vv

precise the term ''family farm,''
The term is a broad label,,,. Over the
years, policy-makers, economists,
sociologists, and many others have attempted
to define the family farm to use it as a
program-directing tool, The testimony at
public meetings reaffirmed previous findings
that broad agreement on a definition of
family farm-by acreage, income, sales,
legal form, or any other readily available
measurement is impossible for the purpose
of economic and policy analysis and perhaps
for program implement.ation also. . , , But the
ideas behind the symbol, the values attached
to it, reflect many, if not most, of the
goals Americans of all occupations and
backgrounds seek in food and agricultural
policy (U,S,D,A, 1981, p,16),
However, despite the obvious difficulties, A Time to
Choose identified three major types of farms: rural
residences, primary farms, and megafarms.

It should be

noted that officially, a farm is defined as a place that
sells at least $1,000 worth of agricultural products a year
[King 1984 , p,12[A]) .
'•Rural residences'' are made up of farms that make
less than $40,000 a year.

These are operations v/ith little
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production and high off-farm incomes.

In 1981 these "rural

residences'' made up 44.4 percent of all places counted as
farms,

Most of these farms produce too little to be able to

rely fully or primarily on farming for a livelihood; they
must depend on supplemental, non farm income,

It is not

unti1 a farm achieves around $40,000 in gross sales that
farm income alone begins to approach an amount considered
adequate for an acceptable standard of living (U.S.D.A.
1981, p,44),
''Primary farms'' generate more than $40,000 in gross
sales and their operators depend primarily upon farming for
their incomes (U,S,D,A, 1981, p,46).

About seven eighths of

all farm output is produced on farms which market over
$40,000 in sales (Strange 1988, p.82).
The third group, ''mega farms, '' constitutes the farms
with sales over $200,000 yearly.

Since A Time to r.hnose v/as

v/ritten, this group is sometimes divided into two groups;
those v/ith sales over $200,000 yearly, and with sales over
$500,000 yearly,
Defining farms by income is a simple Vv'ay to ansv/er the
problem of identifying farm groups.

In order to better

define the terms the following illustrates what might be
described as the extremes of the types of farms found in the
United States,
Family farming (primary farming) tends to be
ovfner-operated, entrepreneurial, dispersed,
diversified, at equal advantage in open
markets, family centered, technologically
progressive, striving for production
processes in harmony with nature, resource
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conserving, farming as a way of life
(Strange 1988, p. 34).
Industrial agribusiness (megafarms) tends to
be industrially organized, financed for
grov/th, large scale, concentrated,
specialized, management centered, capitalintensive, at an advantage in controlled
markets, standardized iu production
processes, resource consumptive, farmed
as a business (Ibid, p.38),
The issue here is the character of rural life and the
organization of a major sector of the economy—a sector that
resonates to the very basis of American life.

Agriculture

constitutes the last vestige of small-scale enterprise and
widespread ovi^nership of productive assets in American
society (Ibid, p,251),

The family farm has long held a

central place in American politics and society.

It is more

than one interest among many; it is a special commitment
Americans made, dating back to the founders
In order to better understand the family farm
situation, in the 1980s and 1990s, it is helpful to set the
background by analyzing the early 1970s.
examines this time period,

Chapter Tv/o

CHAPTER TWO
SETTING THE BACKGROUND

The Seventies
The events that lead to the farm crisis of the 1980s
were set in motion in 1973 ,

Several events had combined to

produce a decrease in overall world food production.

In

1971 and 1972 there was a severe cirought in Africa and a
rice crop failure in Korea and other parts of Asia (Morgan
1980, p.213),
At the same time. President Richard Nixon was pursuing
new foreign markets for U.S. agricultural commodities.

In

1972 Nixon went to China on his historic mission.
Concurrently, Japan began to buy American agricultural
products, especially grains.

By 1981 Japan purchased over

three-fourths of its corn from the United States (Strange
1988, p.18).

U.S. grain shipments increased from 34 million

tons in 1971 to 82 million tons by 1975.

In addition, U.S.

earnings from its agricultural exports grew from $7.7
billion to $21.3 billion (Morgan 1980, p.39).
The American wheat inventory (the average amount of
v^heat stored for future sale throughout the year) stood at a
comfortable 23.5 million tons in 1972.

Just over a year

later, that inventory had slipped to under 7 million tons
(Ibid, p.214).

In turn, the price of U.S. farm products

increased due to the declining inventory.

From 1972 to 1974

the price of wheat went up 132 percent, from $1.76 to $4.09
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a bushel .

Corn v/as up 9 2 percent and soybeans 52 percent in

the same period (USDA 1984. p. 18).
From the Depression through the 1960s farming was
mostly a domestic matter.

Exports to foreign markets never

exceeded $7 billion, so American farmers were largely
insulated from the buffetings of world markets.
Agricultural exports, only $7,3 billion in 1970, grev/ to
$43,8 billion by 1981 (Kilborn 1984, p,22[A]),
Betv/een 1950 and 1970, U.S. v/heat exports increased
from 10 to almost 20 million tons, and corn exports from 2.5
to 12.5 million tons.

Then betv/een 1971 and 1975, the

increase in the international trade nearly equaled the
growth in the whole previous postwar period.

Global trade

in wheat, corn, rice, sorghum, barley, oats, and rye grevv' by
50 percent (from 114 to 157 million tons), and America
supplied most of the increase (Morgan 1980, p,214),
Mixon's 1971 devaluation of the dollar also encouraged
the export of agricultural commodities (Ibid, p.213).

The

decision to let the dollar ''float" in foreign exchange
markets effectively lowered the price of U.S. products and
made American exports more competitive at precisely the same
time foreign demand increased dramatically (U.S.D.A. 1981,
p.24j,
In 1974, as export demand boomed, crops failed in many
regions throughout the world.

Agricultural experts turned

from the old problems of trying to restrain production and
manage surpluses, to worrying about how to feed a hungry
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world (Robbins 1985, p,21[A]).

For example, the Soviet

Union began to buy large amounts of U.S. grain.
Farmers, at the urging of the Department of
Agriculture, planted fields hardly broken from the great
dust bov/1 of the thirties (Gussow 1981, p.128).

Seeking to

maximize U.S. farm output in the face of a strong export
market, the federal government did away v/ith acreage setasides for major crops.

In 1974 four million acres of

former grassland in the Great Plains had been plowed up and
seeded to grain following the massive Russian v/heat purchase
of 1972, when the per bushel price shot up to almost $6.00.
Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz urged farmers to plant
fence row to fence row (Worster 1980, p.231).

Between 1973

and 1981, the number of acres planted to crops on U.S. farms
increased by 12 percent, from 316 million to 353 million
acres (USDA 1984, p.2).
This increase in acreage was accompanied by another
development-farmland prices increased.

The value of

farmland more than quadrupled, from $176 bi11 ion in 1970 to
$715 billion in 1981, but the debt borrowed against it rose
almost as fast, from $29 billion to $96 billion (Strange
1988, p.22).
Ever-present experts in government, the
universities, and the farm trade publications
were advising farmers to expand their
operations (Strange, 1988 p.19). The practice
of borrovv'ing against what one already owns in
order to buy more is called leverage.
Leveraged buying became the hallmark of
excellence in the 1970s, Consultants
recommended it, farm magazines touted
its virtues, agricultural colleges wrote
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fine reports demonstrating its v/isdom, A
progressive farmer was a highly leveraged
farmer who knev/ hov^ to manage money
(Ibid, p.20),
This situation was acceptable as long as farm production
kept its balance with the rapidly expanding demand for the
U.S. export market.
Hov/ever the agricultural outlook began to dim in the
late 1970s.

Farm production had already outstripped foreign

demand so much so that by 1977 the falling prices of key
export crops, especially wheat, corn, and cotton, were
creating significant problems for farmers (Ibid, p.99).

In

addition, some U.S, trading partners were increasing their
production, partially because of the introduction of green
revolution technology, or because Lesser Developed Countries
(LDC's) v/ere burdened by debts that made an increase in
their domestic production a necessary priority.

As the

dollar strengthened, and federal price supports rem.ained in
place, U,S, crops became too expensive for many potential
customers, further intensifying the impact of each of these
factors (Miller 1988, p.256),
The cumulative effect of this chain of events was
created as a result of policies that overstimulated
investments through the 1970s, and other governmental
actions that then brought on a credit squeeze.

For farmers,

the groundwork Vv'as laid through financial policies of
government institutions, such as the Federal Reserve Board
and the Farmers Home Administration, v/hich permitted
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borrov/ing at interest rates that were lower than the rate of
inflation through the 1970s (Robbins 1985, p.20[A]),

This

public subsidy predictably increased farm borrov/ing—to its
highest level ever-precisely at a time when subsidies should
have been falling (Riemenschneider 1985, p,3[A]).
In response to these developments, the Carter
administration implemented several policy changes, but none
of these satisfactorily addressed the major structural
problems.

In the judgment of one scholar, ''no overall

change in federal policy came.

Instead the government

responded with a temporary program to pay farmers not to
plant a portion of their fields, and an expanded program of
federal credit.

The latter was exactly what wasn't needed''

(Strange 1988, p.23).
Another development emerged during the 1970s.

A period

of rapid centralization was underway in an industry that had
resisted such a move much more successfully than most other
American industries.

Most farm failures mean another farm's

growth; two out of every three farmland purchases expanded
existing farms.

Sped up by the farm depression, this

process doubled the average farm size in just three decades
(Lappe 1985 , p.19[A]) .
Whereas previous decades had seen larger family farms
consolidate smaller operations, this transition brought
agriculture into the era of agribusiness.

In addition, the

Department of Agriculture projected that by the year 2000,
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half the farm products v/ould come from the top 1 percent of
U.S. farms (Lin, Coffman, and Penn 1980, p,13).
But even if the crucial transition, from family farming
to industrial agribusiness, occurred in the 1980s, the
conditions that drove it had begun to emerge long before.
Following the Great Depression, the emphasis in agriculture
has been to ''get big or get out'' (Berry 1977, p,41).
Proponents of the new agricultural technology argued that
increased productivity v/ould produce rural depopulation as a
positive result.

For example, it v/as argued that a

retooling of federal policy would have as one of its
accomplishments a reduction in the number of people needed
to feed the nation and produce exports.

This viewpoint

seemed particularly strong during the 19 70s.

Nixon's

Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, often espoused the
principle of concentrated farming among large holders.
'"Each American farmer now feeds himself and fifty-six
others. ... 96 percent of America's manpov/er is freed from
food production'' (Ibid, p.32),

For example, between 1950

and 1955 more than a million workers migrated out of the
agricultural sector and into other sectors of the economy
(Ibid, p,162 ) .
The concept of ''get big or get out'' v/as slowly
altering the makeup of U,S, farms.

Since the early 1960s,

the basic structure of American agriculture has been
changing.

Family-owned farms have grown larger and larger,

and the total area under cultivation expanded.

The costs of
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operating these spreads have grov/n proportionately, and
farmers became some of the countries largest individual
borrowers (King 19 8 5, p.7[A]).
By 1978, there were 2,5 million farms occupied by less
than four percent of the country's population.

The largest

20 percent of those farms, by sales, accounted for four out
of every five dollars produced.

Observers, hov/ever, were

pointing to presvsures on the "disappearing middle,'' the
group of medium-sized places between the big operations and
the part-tim^e farms (U.S.D.A. 1981, p.6).
As a result of the growing farm problem. President
Carter's Secretary of Agriculture, Bob Bergland,
commissioned a study to examine the situation.

In 1981 the

United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) published its
report, A Time to Chnnse.
The study examined how much net farm income varied by
farm size during selected periods since 1960,

It found that

farms v/ith sales over $100,000 had 50 percent greater
variability in income during the period 1962-72 than any
group of smaller farms, and tvy'ice as much variability in the
period 1973-78.

They concluded that overall instability in

farm income was increasing in American agriculture.

The

problem was particularly acute for larger farms because of
their greater reliance on purchased inputs and higher fixed
costs (Strange 1988, p.116).
The study argued that mega farms trade labor for
capital, with no improvement in production efficiencies.
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They contributed to rural unemployment, v/hile producing no
corresponding decrease in food costs.

The study concluded:

''We have passed the point v^here any net gain to society can
be claimed from policies that encourage large farms to
become larger'' (Brown 1983. p.30[A]).
The study reworked existing calculations on economies
of scale in agriculture and reconfirmed their findings: by
the time a farm is large enough to produce $45,000 worth of
farms goods per year, it is already 90 percent efficient.
When it grows to the level of $133,000 in production (still
a modestly sized farm), it has attained as much efficiency
gain as it will achieve, even if it grows much larger (Ibid,
P 30[A]).
As a result of the greatly changed mix of farm firms
and their economic characteristics, continuation of past
programs and policies would likely promote future problems.
Examples included the continued concentration of economic
power, inflation in land prices, and unwise use of
resources, all of this without apparent benefit to the rest
of society (U.S.D.A, 1981, p.41).
A Time to Choose argued that the United States was at a
crossroads.

Federal agricultural policy would need to be

changed in order to encourage the continued existence of the
family farm,

The report stated that powerful forces

underlied the trends toward concentration, and to slov/ those
trends v/ould require major changes in agricultural policies.
More than a single change in a policy or program would be
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necessary.

Instead, it v/ould require numerous changes

across several areas, all of v/hich must be more carefully
coordinated and harmonized,

But, if the recommended changes

in the tax code, commodity, credit, resource-conservation,
research and other programs were made, there would be a
slowing of the trend towards greater concentration.

Slowing

this trend vrould be beneficial to farmers and consumers, and
in the best long-term interests of the U.S. (Ibid, p,152).
The study demonstrated that federal choices faced in
the 1980s would determine the future of family farming,
given the significant pressures facing the industry.

One of

the major factors influencing the authors was the
understanding that in 1978 about 70 percent of those who
ov/ned farmland were over 50 years old.

That land would be

changing hands in the next 20 or 30 years (Ibid, p.6).

This

large group of aging farmers vrould likely sell their
holdings.

The question v/as v/ho would buy it, corporations

or family farmers?

Thg E i g h t i e s
Implementing the changes recommended in the report
would be up to the incoming President, Ronald Reagan, who
had been elected in 1980.

An indication of the approach his

Administr.ation would take was hinted when he named John
Block Secretary of Agriculture.
industrial agribusiness.

Block exemplified

As the New York Times described.

Block ''is a member of an exclusive circle, the 5 percent of

17

the country's farmers v/ho produce half of its agricultural
output,

He is also one of a still smaller group, the 1

percent that earns nearly two-thirds of all farm income''
(Robbins 1981, p,l[A]).
The Block farm demonstrated the opposite of the
Jeffersonian agrarian model, instead it represented
corporate agribusiness.

This operation had two managers

overseeing five employees.

Mr, Block said his holding ¥;as

representative of the large grain and livestock farms,
although his sales were somewhat higher than the $500,000
figure commonly used to describe the largest U.S, farms
(Ibid, p,1[A]),
Very early on in the Reagan Administration, problems
began to appear in the agricultural sector of the economy.
The grov/th in the export market halted, and then began to
decline.

Perhaps for political reasons, some loudly blamed

Carter's 1979 embargo of grain sales to the Soviet Union
after its intervention in Af gh.anistan. but that measure
far outdone by other factors.

'as

Vv

Eventually the Reagan

administration admitted that the embargo was not a prime
factor in the collapse of exports (Strange 1988, p.26).
As exports increased in the 1970s, American farmers had
become more dependent on export markets.

By the 1980s,

farmers were reliant on exports for half to two-thirds of
the major grain crops.

Without these exports, surpluses

quickly piled up. prices fell, and farm incomes declined
(King 1985, p.7[A]).
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The most immediate problem facing the Reagan
Administration was the ever grovv-ing stockpile of
agricultural commodities,

From 1973 until 1982, corn in

storage increased from 484 to 3,120 million bushels,

VVheat

stocks bloated from 340 to 1,515 million bushels (Strange
1988, p,23).

To cushion the effect of declining exports.

Congress follov/ed the Depression-born formula of controlling
product ion.

In order to decrease production, subsidies were

tied to reductions in tilled acreage (King 1985, p.7[A])
In order to better understand these first years under
Reagan, a comparison of statistics from 1979 through 1983
illustrates the effects of the Administration's agricultural
policies.

In 1979, the largest 1 percent of farms

(megafarms) earned 42.1 percent of all profits.

In 1981 the

top 1 percent of all farms took in 66,3 percent of all farm
profits.

In addition, the only farm group averaging losses

in 1979 v/as the group (rural residences) v/ith sales under
$5,000 (Robbins 1983, p.8[A]).
In 1983 there were 380,000 farmers, representing 16
percent of all farmers, v/ith sales betv/een $40,000 and
$100,000,

The average income from farming for this group

was below the poverty level, about $5,500.

In addition,

those with sales betv/een $20,000 and $40,000 earned an
average $505(Robbins 1983, p,12[B]).

At the same time,

there v/ere 24,000 farms v/ith sales exceeding $500,000
annually.

Representing 1 percent of all farms, they

accounted for 29 percent of all sales.

In addition, they
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received nearly half of all the profits earned (Kilborn
1984, p,22[A]),
A special report from the Office of Technology
Assessment stated that at the beginning of 1983, 86,6
percent of the 2.2 million farms were classified as small
with annual gross sales ranging from $5,000 to $19,900,
Large farms, v/ith sales from $200,000 to $499,999, made up
only 4,2 percent of the total and very large farms, those
with sales of $500,00 or more

made up only 1 2 percent

But the large and very large farms took in 53,5 percent of
the total cash receipts of all 2,2 million farms, while the
middle-sized ones received only 19,1 percent (King 1985,
p.25[A]),
The Reagan Administration implemented a novel approach
in agricultural policy in 1983,

In order to reduce the

growing stockpiles of surplus crops, the Administration
proposed the Payment-In-Kind (PIK) program.

Under this

program, farmers were paid in commodities from existing
stockpiles,

At a cost of nearly $10 billion dollars, the

program took nearly 80 million acres out of production
(Kilborn 1984, p,22[A],)

In addition. Block, with the

support of Budget Director David A, Stockman, unsuccessfully
attempted to eliminate subsidies.

Furthermore, Block

re fused to use some of the special farm aid funds Congress
had appropriated in 1981,

In 1983 a federal court ordered

Mr, Block to spend the money (King 1983, p,16[B]),
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In 1984, the Reagan Administration proposed legislation
to sharply curtail government price supports for farmers.
The primary proposal was that the Government would help
farmers only when their commodities fell below 75 percent of
the average open-market price of the previous five years,
But the 75 percent support price for each year would be
established on the basis of the open v/orld market of the
previous five years.

Prices rarely fall to such a level, so

the system would protect farmers only in periods of the
sharpest declines (Kilborn 1984, p.4[A]).

Critics of the

Reagan Administration plan stated that a wide open, freemarket policy would force many farmers off the land, leading
to oligopolies of superfarmers and the collapse of thousands
of farming communities.

Instead, they suggested policies to

help the primary farmers (Kilborn 1984, p.23[A]j,

At the

same time, legislative remedies that nearly all farmers
favored, including emergency credit, a moratorium on
foreclosures, and more stimulation of farm exports were not
being implemented (King 1983, p.11[A]),
By .July of 1984, farm income v/as the lowest ever
recorded in the United States.

Total annual net income from

farming in the previous four years, adjusted for inflation,
averaged less than one-third that of ten years before, and
less than half of 1979's (Lewis 1983, p,23[A]).

In

September of 1984 the Reagan Administration instituted a
$650 million credit relief package,

Hov/ever, by February of

1985. only 21 loans had been approved using $44 mill ion of
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the $650 million authorized (Boyd 1985, p,26[A];i.

By the

end of 1984, farms were failing at a rate of 36 per 1,000,
more than triple the rate of failure for other businesses
{Kilborn 1984 , p,22[A]) ,
In a 1985 special report, the Office of Technology
Assessment found that price support loan programs, which the
Reagan Administration said pushed up American farm commodity
prices to uncompetitive levels, tended to provide more
v/ealth and growth benefits to farms v/ith sales over $200,000
a year.

In contrast, income supports in the form of

subsidies, which the Administration v/anted to phase out,
were more help to farmers
$200,000,

'ith sales from $40,000 to

Vv

''Directing income supports to middle-sized farms

could be an effective policy for prolonging their
survival,'' the report stated (King 1985, p.25[A]).
In 19 8 5 many agricultural experts argued that the
government should act to ease the hardships resulting from
its changes in economic strategy.

Since 1983 many

Government economists had explained that the problems for
farmers v/ere primarily concentrated among middle size farms
with annual sales of over $40,000,

The largest, those with

sales over $500,000 were relatively untouched by the farm
depression (Robbins 1985, p.26[A]),

The full-time, primary

farmers had been hurt the most by the way the farm lavv" and
the budget deficit had v/orked to depress the farm economy
(Kilborn 1985 , p.9[A]) .
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The original 19 85 budget proposal called for $29
billion in cuts in farm-support programs over three years.
As a result of v/ide criticism that proposal was scaled down
to $16 billion.

Democrats and some Republicans contended

that the Administration's proposals would shut down many
medium-sized farms already squeezed by the woist Laim c i i s i s
since the Depression.

Despite the expense involved, they

said, farm-subsidy programs must be saved if tens of
thousands of mid-sized farmers were to survive (Shenon 1985,
p.11[A]).
President Reagan vetoed legislation that v/ould have
provided Federal loan guarantees and other financial help to
farmers in the spring of 1985,

According to Reagan, farmers

''in need of immediate help are less than 4 percent, or
around 4 percent at best, of all farmers in the United
States.''

Agriculture Secretary .John Block, challenged at a

Senate Agricultural Committee hearing, stated that the
President ''misspoke.''

Agriculture Department figures

indicated that one-third of all family-size commercial farms
faced financial difficulty in 1985.

This group included

679,000 farms, and 229,000 of these farms faced problems
ranging from difficulty in servicing debts to technical
insolvency.

According to the Mew York Times, this report

was described as not being widely available, and Michael
Masterson, a special assistant to Mr, Block, said it 'was his
understanding that it had not been scheduled for release
(Farnsv/orth 1985, p.l5[A]).
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To better understand the implications of Reagan's
actions, it is necessary to depict the predicament faced by
U.S. farmers in 1985.

Reagan's high deficit, high interest

rate policies had so strengthened the dollar that American
agriculture was in a trap.

Those two factors had a

tremendous impact on farming; high interest rates because
farmers are heavy borrowers, and the strong dollar because
American farm goods 'ft'ere thus more expensive to foreign
purchasers (Kilborn 1984, p,l[A]).

The high dollar of 1985

brought Canadian hogs into Iowa, and filled Minnesota grain
elevators with Argentine and Australian v/heat,
a longer-term problem loomed on the horizon,

Concurrently
Third World

nations like India, China and Brazil were no longer U

. S .

agricultural export markets; buoyed by high U.S. prices,
they had become competitors (Phillips 1930, p.143).
The Reagan Administration's proposals in 1986 formed a
two part strategy.

The first part called for the gradual

elimination of the farm price support system in place since
the Great Depression.

The second part removed the

Agriculture Department from the emergency loan business and
replace it with already existing commercial banks (King
1985, p.7[B]).
John R. Block defended Reagan's plan to eliminate most
farm price supports and subsidies.

Responding to questions

from reporters regarding the reduction of supports at a time
when m_any farmers were perilously close to foreclosure.
Block stated ''any farm program v^e write won't make a whit
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of difference in how many farmers fail or succeed" (King
1985, p,8[A]),
By 1987 speculators and other absentee investors
accounted for about 31 percent of farm transactions, up from
23 percent in 1983,

As landholdings concentrated, thousands

of farmhouses were torn down, thousands of miles of fences
ripped out (Phillips 1990, p.194).
In autumn 1987 Don Paarlberg, a former senior official
in the Eisenhower, Nixon and Ford agricultural departments,
feared a social revolution as he saw outside capital
flooding in to buy up agri cultural holdings,

'' We are

drifting toward a structure of agriculture which approaches
what we twice (after the Revolution and in the Civil War)
previously rejected-a wealthy, hereditary landowning class,
with new entrants almost ruled out unless they are v^ell-todo {Ibid, p,194),
In the Farm Belt the 1981-87 collapse in commodity and
land prices v/as worse than in the 1920s.
wea1th vanished in the farm states.

Huge amounts of

Estimates indicated

that farmland values declined from $712 billion in 1980 to
$392 billion in 1986 (Ibid, p,193).

From 1972 to 1981, the

value of farmland had increased from an average of $219 to
$823 per acre.

By early 1986, it had fallen to $596.

Adjusted for inflation since 1972, it had fallen all the way
back to $232 (Strange 1988, p.28),
In 1988 farm prices v/ere beginning to recover.

In

1987-88, farmland values bounced back somev.'hat (Phillips
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1990, p,144).

However, by 1988 fev/er farmers could benefit

from this recovery as many had left their farms, voluntarily
or through foreclosure (Ibid, p,193).

Betv^een 1980 and 1986

several hundred thousand part-time and full-time U.S,
farmers quit farming or went bankrupt (Miller 1988, p.256),
Additionally, between 1982 and 1987 the nation lost more
than 50,000 farms (Nelson 1992, p.475),
The 1980s transformed agricultural structure more
forcefully than any previous decade.

The face of

agriculture was changed from the Jeffersonian vision of
farmer,'-'entrepreneurs to industrial agribusiness.

This

metamorphosis was, for the most part, predicted in A Time to
ChQPgg.
The Reagan Administration could not argue that their
actions were the unintended consequences of a failure to
understand the policy choices they made.

Although the

authors of the A Time to Choose failed to predict the high
dollar and the high interest rates of the 1980s, the Reagan
Administration v/ould still have to be held accountable for
those developments as well,

The Administration shared in

the responsibility for the farm recession.

Farm credit

rates were higher because Vtashington had to borrovv* heavily
to cover its ovm deficits (Mev»^ York Times 1985, p,26[A]),
For example, farmers debts were $80 billion in 1973,
1980, that debt had risen to $155 billion.
^

In

Just three years
J.

after Reagan took office, in 1983, that debt had jumped to
$214 billion (Kilborn 1984, p,22[A]).
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In order to better understand the ramifications of
Reagan's agricultural policy decision making, an examination
of tv/o important policies v/ill be undertaken in Chapter
Three.

CHAPTER THREE
AN OVERVIEW OF TWO CRITICAL POLICIES

Introduction
The Reagan years demonstrated that the authors of A
Time to Choose had accurately predicted changes affecting
agriculture.

The report had identified the farm commodity

programs and federal tax policy as t'vv'o of the most
influential policies affecting the structure of agriculture:
The (then) present tax policies are having
significant effect on farm structure—on
balance, they are biased toward the larger
farmers and wealthy investors
(U.S.D.A, 1981, p,i42),
Our studies find that tax policy has
significantly affected the structure, largely
by reinforcing and supporting the consequences
of other economic forces and policies
(Ibid, p,149).
The commodity programs have succeeded to some
extent in supporting prices received by all
farmers-both participants and nonparticipants,
E.ut the evidence clearly suggests the programs
have distributed income to the largest farmers,
not necessarilv on the basis of need
(Ibid. p.103),^
The authors also offered advice for future
policymakers.

Policies and programs should be carefully

modified, with farm structure clearly in mind, so that they
no longer encourage short-sighted exploitation of
agricultural resources v/ith no thought for their use over
the longer term.

Future policymakers must recognize the

costs to society of unnecessary concentration.

Procedures

should be modified to make financial and technical
assistance available for those who would otherwise be
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adversely affected by economic forces and policies (Ibid,
p.143).

The ''who'' referred to in the preceding sentences,

turned out to be the primary farmers in the 1980s,

Subsidy Policy
There are two principal aims behind agricultural
subsidies.

One is to protect farmers against the inherent

instability of the markets.

Market prices tend to vary from

year to year and even season to season.

Even greater

instability has been introduced since the early 1970s with
the increasing proportions of U.S. commodities that are sold
in foreign markets, v/here demand varies widely.

The second

purpose is to stabilize prices and supplies for consumers
(Robbins 1983. p.l[A]),
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Reagan Administration
repeatedly attempted to phase out subsidies,

Unable to

persuade Congress to go along it seems ironic that during
the last year of Reag,an's tenure. agricultur.al subsidy
policy staved off potential disaster.

The 1988 drought

provided one of the best examples of how a governmentfinanced farm program can pay big dividends for the
consumer.

The government spent 15 billion dollars to ensure

a stable stockpile of commodities from 1986 to 1990.
HoV'?ever, if taxpayers had not invested that money, it would
have cost them—the consumers—an additional $40 billion at
the grocery store just because of the inflation caused by
the 1988 drought.

Because the U.S. had ample supplies of
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commodities, the effect on food prices was never felt by
consumers (Cubbage 1994, p.10).
There 'rfere tv/o basic devices for farm income support in
the early 1980s.

Price support loans guarantee farmers

against disastrous price declines.

For example, in 1982

when corn was selling for about $2 a bushel, a participating
farmer could take advantage of low interest government loans
to help him wait for better prices.
$2,55 a bushel.

He could have borrovv'ed

Aided by the loan, he could v/ait and sell

his corn for $3.80 price which the market savv- in 1983.

At

this point the farmer would sell his corn and pay off the
loan,

If the price of corn had not gone higher than the

$2,55 a bushel he borrowed, he could forfeit the corn and
keep the money.
The second device was a deficiency payment.

If the

average market prices fall belovv' a certain point, called a
target price, the government steps in v/ith a payment.

There

is a maximum 15 cents a bushel ceiling under this program.
In 1982, that price v/as $2.70, 15 cents higher than the loan
rate of $2,55 per bushel.
In order to participate in these programs, farmers have
to cooperate in programs aimed at controlling production.
In 1982 farmers had to idle 20 percent of their normal
acreage.

In addition they v/ere paid $1,50 per bushel for

the yields they v/ould normally get from the set aside
acreage (Robbins 1983, p,12[B]),
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The expense of these programs was becoming one of the
Reagan Administration's biggest problems,

According to a

Ne'tf York Times art icie, agricultural policy was the Reagan
Administration's largest domestic failure,

Federal spending

for agricultural price supports soared sevenfold between
1980 and 1983 .

The total cost of farm programs exceeded $50

billion in 1983, yet farm bankruptcies v/ere near record
highs, farmland value was falling and farm income v^as 20
percent below 1979 levels.

The more the Government spent,

the v/orse off farmers had become (Bovard 1986, p,23[A]).
As a result, various approaches were explored in an
attempt to reduce expenditures.

One way to reduce

agricultural subsidies is to limit the annual amount each
farmer can receive.

In 1971 Congress enacted a $10,000

limit on payments per farm,

Hov/ever, it was raised during

subsequent legislative negotiation to $20,000,

It v?as again

later raised to $30,000 and by 1983 it was $50,000 I'Mew York
Times 1983, p,3[C] '( ,
Despite the payment limitation, the biggest farms still
received most of the payments the government made directly
to farmers.

For example, the largest 10 percent of the

wheat farms got about 4 3 percent of the government payments
in 1982 v/hile the smallest 10 percent received but 1.4
percent.

The top 10 percent of the cotton farms the same

year got about 40 percent of the payments, the bottom 10
percent, 1.2 percent.

For corn the largest 10 percent got
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over a third of the payments, v/hile the smallest 10 percent
got only 1,2 percent (Strange 1988, p,129).
According to a 1985 study by the Agriculture
Department, just 24 percent of the direct aid v/ent to
farmers who were badly stressed, but fully a third went to
farmers v/ith annual revenues greater than $250,000 fMew York
Times 1985, p,18[A]),

Consequently, the Reagan

Administration proposed a plan for reducing the limits on
the subsidies an individual farm could receive.
would drop from $50,000 to $20,000 annually.
cap vas proposed on price support loans,

The limit

In addition, a

A $200,000 cap v/as

suggested, where previously there had been no limit (King
1985, p,l[A]).

But those limits were soon evaded when big

farmers learned how to divide ownership of their acreage
into smaller units, each of which qualified for the maximum
amount.

For example, in 1986 the Crown Prince of

Liechtenstein, a Texas landov^ner, received more than $2
million in federal subsidies (Miller 1988, p.258).
The subsidy policies had another unintended effect.
The aforementioned loan rates become the v/orld price and, in
turn, foreign competitors know v/hat they can expect to get
for crops which vie v;ith American crops.

As a result, the

element of risk is removed from planting decisions since the
Americans had inadvertently set a minimum world price.

In

turn, this situation allows foreign competitors to undercut
American farmers in bidding for v/orld markets (Kilborn 1984,
p.22[A]).

Thus the 1985 farm bill deviated from previou
policy,

A new program using an old strategy, the

Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 'rfas a long term,
voluntary land retirement procjram,

It allowed produt

uO

bid to enroll land in the CRP if they had; 1) an appropriate
cropping history and 2) croplands considered highly erodible
or environmentally sensitive.

Most contract holders got

annual payments for 10 years in exchange for converting and
maintaining those lands in conserving uses (Clark, Johnson,
and Amosson 1994, p,1415).
The combination of a recovering economy and the
reduction of output, as a result the CRP, helped put an end
to the problems for Reagan.

According to Kevin Phillips, in

his book The Politics of the Rich and Poor, the farm
subsidies of the Reagan Administration years vere anything
but a ''from the beginning'' strategy.

Farm income support

outlays did mushroom during the 1980s (up from $11 billion
in 19 81 to $25 billion in 1985 and a peak of $31 billion in
1986 ), but that v/as because farmers had been devastated
during the mid-1980s by tight money and by the international
trade impact of the overpriced dollar,

Stepped-up federal

support payments were less a reward than a form of
reparations (Phillips 1990, p.89).
In 1983 one analyst noted that even though they are no
more efficient, it is the large corporate producers v,'ho stay
in business, v/hile family operations go bankrupt.

This

situation was the result of the commodity programs, the
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Federal loan programs and the tax lav/s which favor the
biggest producers.

At the same time, the biggest producers

v/ere usually conglomerates v/ith other sources of income
(Brov/n 1983, p,30[A]),

Once again, family farmers were

devastated by Reagan's farm policy.

This situation almost

exactly duplicates what A Time to Choose had predicted,
which was that a decision not to implement the changes
recommended within the report would lead to an increase of
corporate owned megafarms,
In the case of commodity policy, analyst Marty Strange
explains it best,

The dilemma is this: when government sets

commodity prices, it is not fixing a minimum standard of
1iving for farm families.

Instead, it is establishing a

minimum return on investments in farmland.

The benefits of

such a progi^am fall squarely to those who own land and in
direct proportion to the amount they ov/n (Strange 1988, p.
199 ) ,
The effects of the 1985 farm bill, v/hich finally
created a solution to the commodity problem, were not really
felt until the very end of the of the Reagan years.

It was

a case of too little, too late for hundreds of thousands of
primary farmers.

Tax policy affected agriculture in much the same v/ay as
commodity policy in the 1980s,

A Time to Choose v/arned of

the effects of unchanged agricultural tax policy for primary

farrrsers

''Thos;© firms' with considerabl© wsalth or in high

income tax brackets have the greatest ability to utilize the
tax rules to their benefit,

Research results are consistent

on one point: the direction of change caused by tax policies
has been towards increased concentration ot farms and
wea11 h•• (U.S,D.A. 1981, p.91) .
In the early 1980s the United States tax code sheltered
high tax bracket individuals v^ho invested in farming
enterprises.

Yet, at the same time, many primary farmers

v/ere in the zero tax bracket because they lacked the
necessary income.

Income from farming denied the I.R.S, by

tax shelters was almost twice the amount generated.

As this

continued the econoinic conseguences were speeding up tne
trends to deny ownership of farmland to those who were
really farming it (Breimyer 1984, p,2[C]).
Prior to 1986, tax breaks were distributed in
proportion to the capital-intensity of the operation.
Assuming that the corporation was in the 46 percent tax
bracket, the established farmer in the 30 percent tax
bracket, and the beginning farmer in the 20 percent bracket,
the corporation would receive nearly tv/ice the tax subsidy
per animal produced as the established farmer ($189 per sow
versus $104),

Likewise, the established farmer v/ould reap

nearly twice the subsidy per sow as the beginning farmer
($104 versus $56),

Thus, the corporate farm got nearly

three and a half times as much tax subsidy as the beginning
farmer (Strancje 1988, p,158).
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In 1984 the Economic Research Service of the Department
of Agriculture reported that 50 percent of direct Government
subsidies in 1983 went to the farms with the top 10 percent
in gross annual sales (megafarms).

The first recommendation

within the report suggested changing tax policies that
encouraged investment in farming solely to shelter nonfarm
income, and to end special tax deductions that encouraged
farm inefficiencies (Carpenter 1985, p.34[D]j.

But it would

not be until 19 86 before this advice was heeded.
Once again, it was not until the end of the second
Reagan term that policy changed to benefit primary farmers,
The 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminated the investment tax
credit,

It allov/ed the use of cash accounting by investors

only if they were directly involved in the management of the
farm,

It also prohibited those investors not directly

involved in the management of the farm from using farm
losses to shelter other income from taxation, and it limited
the use of prepaid expenses.

Perhaps most importantly, it

provided that capital gains be taxed as regular income
(Strange 1988, p,163).
Although the tax and subsidy changes recommended by A
Time to Choose were finally implemented, the delay involved
sped up the transition from family farming to industrial
agribusiness.

Chapter Four explores the 1990s to determine

whether the trends established in the previous decade
continued, and discusses significant policy changes that
were implemented in 1995,

CHAPTER FOUR
THE 1995 FARM BILL

Introduction
The concern, depicted in A Time to Choose, vms that the
ever increasing concentration of farm ownership would
continue until only a few huge farms controlled nearly all
agricultural production,
authors had predicted.

The eighties unfolded much as the

However, the nineties might be an

opportunity for change., this chapter explores this
possibility,

ThQ F.^rly Nineties
Examining the average size of a farm at various points
throughout this century demonstrates that agriculture is
still in the process of moving tov^ards ever larger farms.
Farms in the 1930s averaged about 150 acres (Kilborn 1984,
p,l[A]),
acres.

In the 1940s they had grov/n to an average of 195
Moving ahead to the 1970s, the average farm was 390

acres (Berry 1977, p,34).

By the mid 1980s farms averaged

more than 400 acres (Kilborn 1984, p.l[A]),

Between 1987

and 1992, average farm size increased from 462 to 491 acres
fThe Prairie Star 1995, p,37[C]),
FolloVf'ing the trend established in the 1980s, by 1992
there were 333,865 farms with sales of $100,000 or more.
While they accounted for only 17 percent of all farms, these
superfarms were responsible for 83 percent of total sales.
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By 1994, farms with over $100,000 in sales still only
represented 17% of all farms, yet they had increased their
percentage of total sales to 87 percent of all sales
(Rightmire 1994, p.l)

In 1987 there were 32,023 farms with

sales of $500,000 or more.

By 1992. farms of this size had

increased in number to 46,914 I'Thp, Prairie Star 1995,
p,37[C]),

Betv/een 1987 and 1992, average sales from all

farms grew from $65,165 to $84,459,

At the same time

average expenses per farm increased from $51,797 to $67,928
CIbid, p,37[C]).
Thus, not surprisingly. there has been a decrease in
small and medium-sized farms and an increase in large farms.
Future projections indicate that in approximately 15 years
there will be only 360,000 farms with sales of $100,000 or
more and they v/ill account for almost all agricultural
production.

V>/hat little other production there is will be

represented by a large number of very small farms which v,'ill
be basically hobby farms (Margolis 1994, p.l[A]),
An examination of early 1990s subsidy policies shows
that government subsidies to farmers follow the same pattern
which exemplified the 1980s.

A 1995 report by the

President's Counci1 on Economic Advi sors notes that '' two
thirds of payments go to the largest 18 percent of farmseven though the average income of these recipients is triple
that of the average U.S. household" (The Amicus .Tournal
199 5, p,5 0 ) ,
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These statistics demonstrate that the direction in
agriculture continued to follov/ the pattern established in
the 1980s,

However. 1995 was a year that presented an

opportunity for possible change.

By Congressional

tradition, a Farm Bill is generated at five year intervals,
and 1995 was the year which forced Congress to examine
agricultural policy.

The question was v/ould the result be a

continuation of past policy, or perhaps a change in a new
direction?

The 1995 Farm Bill
The 1995 farm bill v/as made into law in April of 1996.
Billed as ''Freedom to Farm,the Federal Agricultural
Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act v^as passed and signed by
President Clinton.

This lav/ made tremendous changes in

agricultural policy.

The old system of transfer payments

was to be abandoned.

Under the FAIR Act, transfer payments

through the year 2002 are scheduled and do not depend on
market prices or prespecfled target prices.

The stated

intent is to move to a more market oriented agriculture and
phase out government transfer payments (Baquet 1996, p,22).
In conjunction with FAIR another law was instituted.
Entitled the Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP).
this act lumped together the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRPj with earlier conservation legislation.

EQIP had an

additional far-reaching effect on family farms that will be
discussed in the final section of this chapter.
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However, in terms of subsidy policy, the goal of EQIP
is to reduce government involvement in overall production.
Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman was quoted as saying,
'•gone v/ill be the days of using the CRP as a method of
controlling how much of a particular crop is grown''
(Brasher 199 6, p.l).
Consequently, the combination of FAIR and EQIP have
drastically altered the outlook for U.S. agriculture.

These

acts are viev/ed as a radical departure from the price
supports and land set-aside provisions of the farm bills of
the last 60 years.

Some experts say the farm bill is aimed

at commercial agriculture, and it ignores small farms and
rural life.

A more liberal farm organization, the Farmers

Union, is concerned that farmers are losing their safety net
(Stevens 1996, p.3).
Hov/ever, regardless of the standpoint from which this
farm bill is viev/ed, it is clear that the federal government
v/ill no longer attempt to intervene on behalf of the family
farm or any other farm for that matter, since the
governmental role will be almost nonexistant after 2002.

It

seems safe to conclude that the further consolidation of
agriculture will continue and that farm sizes will continue
to grow and farm numbers will continue to decline.
The consequences of the 1995 farm bill do not give much
hope to family farmers.

The fact that the government is in

the process of reducing it's role in agricultural policy
could certainly be viewed as the culmination of 80s policy,
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In fact, Reagan Vv'as unable to achieve his goal of making
agriculture a ''market oriented'' industry, which is exactly
what FAIR accomplished.
The 1995 farm bill altered another facet of
agricultural policy v^hich dates back to the 1930s, The issue
at stake was the renewal of the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP).

As mentioned earlier, the CRP was created during the

mid 1980s,

This program was, up until 1995, the most recent

government policy concerning soil erosion.

The conclusion

of this chapter examines this in greater detail.

The CRP and Soil Erosion
At first glance the link between soils and farming
might not be obvious, but the topic should not be
underestimated.

The greatest dilemma facing agricultural

production (whether by family farmers or agribusiness), both
historically and currently, is soil erosion.

To understand

the ramifications of soil erosion, one only has to look at
the 1930s,

During that period, commonly referred to as the

Dust Bowl, the United States was involved in one of the
three greatest, manmade, ecological disasters in the history
of the world (Worster 1979, p.4).

Since the introduction of

mechanized agriculture, which occurred just before the Dust
Bovs'l, soil surveys by the Soil Conservation Service

indicated that about one-third of the original topsoil on
U.S, croplands, in use as of the mid-1980s, had already been
washed or blown into ri%''ers, lakes, and oceans,

Some of the
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country's richest agricultural lands, such as those in Iowa,
have lost about half their topsoil (Miller 1988, p,198).
Most importantly, soil erosion is greatly increased as a
direct result of agribusiness farming methods.

Using these

methods projected soil erosion, over the next 5 0 years, may
destroy productivity on U.S. cropland acreage equal to the
combined areas of the states of Nev/ York, Mew .Jersey, Maine,
Mew Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut (Ibid. p,198).
One of the reasons that soil erosion has not been a
high priority government policy is that it usually occurs at
such a slow rate that its cumulative effects take decades to
become apparent.

For example, the removal of 1 millimeter

(1./254 inch) of soil, an amount easily lost during a rain or
wind storm, is so small that it goes undetected; but the
accumulated soil loss at this rate over a 25-year period
would amount to 25 mm (1 inch)—an amount that would take
about 500 years to replace by natural processes.

If the

average rate of topsoil erosion exceeds the rate of topsoil
formation, the topsoil on that land becomes a nonrenewable
resource that is being depleted (Ibid, p.205),
During the late 1970s, soil erosion rates v/ere
considered to be very high.

According to a 1382 federal

survey, 4 4 percent of the crop land in the United States v/as
losing topsoil at ''excessive rates,'' with 1,7 billion tons
permanently lost each year.

Studies in the United States

Corn Belt shov/ that for each inch of topsoil lost, average
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yields are reduced by 6 percent I'Mev.' York Times 1984,
P.20[A]),
Since 197 5, nearly 70 million acres of new farmland had
been brought into production,

A large percentage of this

new farmland was highly erodabl© land, much of it former
grasslands and wetlands (Schneider 1985, p.l6[A]).
In 1984 government policy reversed direction, from the
policies of the 1970s v/hen farmers

'ere encouraged to plant

Vv

''fence post to fence post, '' and 82 million acres v/ere
idled.

However, these kinds of inconsistent government

policies can contribute mightily to soil erosion as a New
York Times article explained,

''In the 1970s, urged to grow

all they could, farmers planted crops on lands that never
should have been plowed.

Vs^hen paid to desist, the hard-

pressed farmers lacked the money or time to reseed the idle
land'' ['New York Times 1984, p,16[A]),
Thus, a response to the dual problems of soil erosion
and the reintroduction of farming of former grassl.ands was
addressed in the 1985 farm bill,

It contained stipulations

making farmers who destroyed fragile land ineligible for
Government benefits.

Additionally, provisions were made to

take 40 million acres, 10 percent of U.S. farmland, out of
production to become part of a nev/ national land inventory.
Only grass or tress could be grown on this land (Schneider
1985, p,16[A]),
The program created by the 1985 farm bill came to be
known as the GRP.

The CRP developed as part of tv/o farm
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bills.

Congress enacted the program in Title XII of the

Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA) and amended it in the Food,
Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 (FACTA),

In

order to put cropland into the CRP, farmers v/ere required to
sign ten-year contracts with the government.

Congress'

original objective for the CRP was to reduce cropland
erosion.

Secondary objectives were to: 1) protect the

nation's long-term capacity to produce food and fiber,
2) reduce sedimentation, 3) improve water quality, 4) create
fish and v/ildlife habitat. 5) curb production of surplus
commodities, and 6) provide farm income suppor t f Furrow
1995, p.30).
In addition, the CRP recognized that conservation
required attention not only of public lands, but on private
lands as v/ell.

Since three quarters of all land in the

lower 48 states is private land the inclusion of farmers,
the principal landov/ners, v/as obvious.
By 1995, a decade after its inception, some conclusions
concerning the overall effectiveness of the CRP had become
apparent.

One of the consequences had been that soil

erosion had been reduced on cropland by one-third (Johnson
1995, p.22).

On average, the rate of soil erosion on land

that 'rfent into CRP v/as reduced from more than 20 tons per
acre annually to less than tv^o tons (Cubbage 1994, p,40).
Eventually, 36,500,000 total acres were enrolled in the
Conservation Reserve Program f Farm .Journal 1995, p. 36)

The

U.S.D.A.'s Economic Research Service (ERS) estimates soil
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erosion reduction on the 36,5 million acres enrolled in CRP
at ?00 million tons annually.

In turn, this cut in soil

erosion spawned major improvements in water and air quality,
ERS figures sediment flov/ into waterways had been cut by 100
million tons a year (Mooney 1994 , p.28),
Another facet of the CRP has been a rebirth of native
habitats for v/ildlife (Ibid, p.28),

A North Dakota study

found that over 70 species of wild birds make their home on
CRP land (Cubbage 1994, p,40 5,

V'^ildlife biologists say

things v/ill only get better as CRP wetlands restorations and
2 million-plus acres of tree planting come into full bloom.
In fact, the ERS estimated in 1990 that society stand to
glean as much as $13 billion v/orth of environmental benefits
from the life of the CRP program (Mooney 1994, p,28).
But the first of the program's 10-year contracts
expired Oct, 1,1995,

The contracts that ended in 1995

covered just over 2 million acres enrolled in the CRP,
Furthermore, contractual commitments that ended in 1996
covered more that 13 million acres or about 36 percent of
all CRP land fFurrow 1995, p,30),

In addition, nearly

'o-
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thirds of the 36,5 million acres in CRP will come out of the
program in 1997 and 1998 (Cubbage 1994, p,40).
The 1995 farm bill forced Congress to decide if it v/as
going to continue appropriating money to extend the
contracts or, perhaps, purchase easements to maintain the
retired lands in conservation use f Furrov/ 1995, p,30).

But

even if Congress had decided to offer to extend some or all

of these contracts, producers would have to decide about
their CRP land's future use (Ibid, p. 30),

Hov/ever, several

studies indicate that farmers intend to put 40 percent or
more of CRP land back into production.

That means that 14,6

million acres of erosive land was targeted to once again
begin producing crops (Horstmeier 1994, p.12).
At the same time, as of 1995, not including the land
taken out of production by the CRP, soil erosion still
impaired one out of four acres (The Amicus Journal 1995,
p,50),

Allov/ing the environmentally sensitive land,

enrolled in the CRP, to re-enter production would further
worsen soil erosion and water quality problems.
Additionally, a great number o£ wildlife habitat acres would
be lost (Cubbage 1994, p.40).
Therefore, many argued that the effects of potentially
ending the CRP would have profound ramifications for the
future of the U.S. soil inventory.

Additionally, some

experts contended that discontinuing the CRP v/ould likely
cost the government more than if it had been continued.

If

CRP land re-entered production, it could mean bigger grain
surpluses and lower commodity prices which in turn
translates into larger government commodity price deficiency
payments to farmers (Ibid, p.40),
With the passage of EQIP, the CRP was abandoned,

The

nev/ conservation program uses five and ten year contracts
v/hich pay for up to 75 percent of the cost of conservation
pract i ces.

Additionally, total cost-share payments to any
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person are limited to $10,000 annual and $50,000 for the
life of the contract fRanchland Revievv' 1996, p,7).
Moreover, it is estimated that more than 40 percent of CRP
land is not vulnerable enough to qualify under the new rules
(Ibid. p,l).

According to another estimate this will amount

to at least 14 million acres of land re-entering production
as CRP contracts expire (Stevens 1996, p.3),

Additionally,

another facet of EQIP allows producers who have CRP
contracts v/hich are five years old or older the option to
request an early release (Johnson, Zidack, and Stauber 1996,
p , 21) ,
The result is that the government policy concerning
soil erosion, once again, reversed course.

Rather than

keeping the highly erodable lands protected by CRP contracts
out of production, the 1995 farm bill allows for much of
these lands to, again, be brought under cultivation,

Thus

the soil erosion policy of the 1980s will be significantly
diminished.

As a result, soil erosion rates are likely to

become the problem they were in the 1970s,

However, there

is one key difference, as a result of the aforementioned
expansion in farm sizes, and the increase in soil erosion
associated with agribusiness farming techniques, the
possibility of greatly increased soil erosion exists.
Unfortunately, soil is a non-renewable resource, and the
latest government policy does not appear to address the
issue.

47

Now that the future of agriculture appears fairly
clear, at least in terms of government policy, an obvious
question would be v/hat are the effects of this transition
from family farming to industrial agribusiness.

Chapter

Five begins by describing the situation facing agriculture
at the present time,

CHAPTER FIVE
CULTURAL AMD SOCIOECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

T h g Current Situation

One of the problems identified in A Time to Choose was
the aging of the average U.S. farmer.

An analysis of the

intervening time period reveals a number of findings.
Robert Soileau, extension rural sociologist

Dr,

'ith Louisiana

Vv

State University, notes that a recurring concern in
agricultural circles is the advancing age of U.S. farmers.
The census of agriculture has shown a rise in their average
age for several decades, from 48.0 years in 1940 to 52,0 in
1987.

The most damaging change, however, appears to be the

percentage of farmers younger than 35.

For example, those

under 2 5 rose from 5 7,000 in 197 0 to 101,000 by 1984.

By

1990, their number had fallen to 52,000, largely due to the
agricultural crisis of the 80's.

As a percentage of all

farmers, those under 3 5 dropped from 20.3 percent to 13.3
percent in that same time span fLandhandler 1994 p.2).
A coexisting situation has appeared,

It is very

possible that 75 percent of all farm assets will change
hands in the next 20 years.

The reason is that thirty-four

percent of all agricultural assets are held by individuals
over the age of 65 (Kohl, 1993 p.6).
Furthermore, to gain entry into agriculture, economic
farming units typically will require $2 million or more of
assets.

Because the family farm must be refinanced each
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generation, it is burdened in generating net worth to form
an economic unit.

Strategies such as aid from parents and

off-farm work help, but difficulties will intensify
especially

'hen competing with corporations not facing life

Vv

cycle problems (Tweeten 1994, p,24[C]),
At the same time, as of the mid 1390's, off-farm income
is deemed critical for those with sales under $200,000
annually, the cutoff point for primary farms.

This large

income is recommended to enable these producers to maintain
their standard of living (Kohl, 1993 p.6). When A Time to
Chose was written, rural residences were described as the
operations that required off farm income.

This category of

farms generated less than $40,000 a year.
However, as these statistics demonstrate, young farmers
are the least likely to be able to purchase farms.

This

situation, coupled with the understanding that the basic
premise of family farming is that one has the opportunity to
obtain land and pay for it through farming, makes for a
dubious future ,

In addition, as of 1993, forty-seven

percent of all young farmers' assets were rented, leased, or
jointly owned (Ibid, p.6),

In other words, these people,

who if they belonged to their parents generation, would have
bought farms, instead, as of the mid 1990s are dependent on
other methods to gain entry into agriculture.
Throughout this discussion one question begs to be
ansv/ered.

Why is it necessary to have young farmers?

One

expert, Wendell Berry, responds in a New York Times article.

50

The first issue was whether or not farming can be understood
as an industry.

Berry argued that it cannot for two primary

reasons: First, farming depends upon living creatures and
biological processes, whereas the materials of industry are
not alive, except of course, the workers, and the processes
are mechanical; and, second, a factory is, and is expected
to be, temporary, v/hereas a farm, if well farmed, will last
forever, and if poorly farmed destroyed forever.
In turn, a second question is whether or not the most
productive agriculture in necessarily the best.

Berry

argued that it is not, for good agriculture requires soil
conservation and other forms of maintenance as v/ell as
productivity,

U.S. soil erosion rates, v/hich are expected

to increase as a result of EQIP, suggest that agricultural
yields are coming at an enormous cost, v/hich sooner or later
must be paid (Berry 1985, p.27[A]).
As Berry explains, it is based on factors more cultural
than technocratic.

The basic methods have been available

for hundreds of years, but they can be used only by farmers
who know hovv to use them and who have the desire to use
them.

The only known way to get these farmers in

substantial numbers is to rear them on farms, in farming
families that are not too strapped for time or money to farm
well.

In America, because of the belief in private

ov/nership of property, this means that farmland must be
divided and ov/ned in small parcels and that farms, farmers,
and farm communities must thrive (Ibid, p.27[A]),

By way of
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comparison, during the Great Depression, over one-fourth of
the American people v/ere farmers and many more had grown up
on farms or knew parents who had been farmers (Strange 1988,
p,15) ,
Thus, the current situation facing potential family
farmers cannot be viewed as very promising.

However there

have been times v/hen policymakers addressed the implications
of the reduced role of the family farm.

The following is

provided as an example of such a time.

Historical Analysis
Nineteenth century American history offers examples
demonstrating the effects of large farms and the problems
they created.

According to Don Piasani, in his book From

the Family Farm to Agribusiness, the most distressing aspect
of large scale farming in the 1870s, vms the way in which it
stifled the family farm.
land baron.

Small farms were anathema to the

Most large farmers opposed small farming,

In

turn, critics of large scale farming charged that the large
farms retarded the development of rural communities and
degraded the status of labor.

The vast farms were all but

deserted except in the late fall and spring.

Since field

hands were needed only during planting and harvesting, they
became a transient work force.

Agricultural wealth depended

on a permanent class of dispossessed v/ho worked for
''starvation v,'ages'' (Pisani 1984, p.ll).
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The greatest danger posed by large scale farming was
its tendency to perpetuate, if not create, land monopoly,

A

special committee of the California Legislature, one of
several formed in the 1870s to study land problems in the
state, argued that these types of land monopolies created a
vast class of renters similar to conditions at that time of
land tenure in Europe (Ibid, p.14).
In the nineteenth century, many Californians viewed the
future v/ith alarm.

In 1871, Henry George v/arned that

California might suffer the same fate as Rome:
In the land policy of Rome may be traced
the secret of her rise, the cause of her
fall. The (Roman) Senate granted away
the public domain in large tracts, just
as our Senate is doing now: and the
fusion of the little farms into large
estates by purchase, by force, and by
fraud v/ent on, until v/hole provinces
were ov/ned by tv/o or three proprietors,
and chained slaves had taken the place
of the sturdy peasantry of Italy. The
small farmers who had given her strength
to Rome v/ere driven to the cities, to
swell the ranks of the proletarians,
and become clients of the great families,
or abroad to perish in the wars. There
came to be but two classes
the enormously
rich and their dependents as slaves; society
thus constituted bred its destroying
monsters; the old virtues vanished,
population declined, art sank, the old
conquering race actually died out, and
Rome perished
Centuries ago this
happened, but the laws of the universe
are to-day what they v/ere then (Ibid, p. 12).
The vision these leaders had in California, foreseeing
the effects of large scale farmincj, demonstrates that there
has been a historical concern for the future of small-scale
family farms.

Moving into the 20th century, a number of
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studies have examined another consequence associated v/ith
industrial agribusiness.

In this case, the effects of

poverty associated with large scale farming will be
analyzed.
In the late 1930s, a government study was conducted
corrtparing the consequences of family farming versus
industrialized agriculture in terms of rural impact.

The

central hypothesis was that the key factors influencing
community development was the percentage of hired v/orkers in
the farm-occupation mix:

the higher the proportion, the

lower the quality of life in the community.
supported the hypothesis.

The findings

In 1977, the Small Farm Viability

Project provided a follow-up study.

Again, the evidence

supported the earlier findings (U.S.D.A. 1981, p.38).
A 1986 University of California-Davis study found that
as farm size increases, so does poverty (U.S. Congress 1986,
p,27).

''In rural communities dominated by very large

(agribusiness] firms, the settlement and housing patterns
reflect the increasingly transient nature of the labor
force.

The symbol of the large corporate farm becomes the

trailer house'' (Berry 1977, p.172),
Moving ahead into the 1990s, the average employee at
the National Farms hog operation, a typical corporate hog
farm, earns $15,000 per year.

Considering that the salaries

of managers are above those of the average worker, it's easy
to conclude that vrorking for a corporate-owned hog facility
is a poor substitute for an entrepreneurial farming
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operation.

Yet, such jobs may be the only alternatives

available for hog producers unable to compete v/ith the
factory farms' cheap pork chops (Carter 1994, p.3),
It seems fair to conclude that the situation facing
aspiring farmers, currently, does not look very promising,
Hov^ever, the combination of that predicament, in conjunction
with the diminished role of the family farm, has other
consequences as well.

The following section investigates

some of these developments.

Implications of Concentration
Another disturbing trend has come to light in the
1990s.

The following example indicates that further

concentration in agriculture, predicted in A Time to Choose,
is fast becoming a reality,

Nebraska-based IBP and ConAgra

and Minneapolis-based Cargill control about 80 percent of
all beef packaged in the United States,

In 1994 cattle

auction prices v/ere 95 cents; in 1995 prices plunged to 64
cents.

Agricultural economists state that this is the worst

downturn in 25 years (McGrory 1996, p,7[A]),

At the same

time, several signs point to anything but disaster in the
cattle industry.

The cattle supply was up only 3 percent

over 1993; consumer meat prices have failed to drop v/ith the
cattle prices; and years of declining meat consumption seems
to have leveled off and show signs of rebounding.

As a

result, the U.S.D.A. has started a study of market
conditions and the U.S. Senate has approved a bill calling
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for an executive branch task force to analyze the situation
(Ibid. p.7[A]),
Although other facets of agricultural production have
not been affected as dramatically as the beef industry,
there is growing evidence that other commodities may soon be
similarly affected.

In order to demonstrate this

contention, an profile of the industrialization of
agriculture v^ill be undertaken.
The term for this process, the movement of food
processors and input suppliers into food production, is
vertical integration,

It is best described as ownership

control of more than one stage moving up and do'rfn the chain
between production and consumption.

Agricultural

commodities that are produced as a result of the vertical
integration process have a number of characteristics that
distinguish them from commodities traded in the traditional
markets found at the farm lev^el ,

Meanv/hile, commodities

that depend primarily on traditional markets tend to be
those produced by typical, independent family-farm
operations (U.S.D.A, 1981, p.62).
The vertically integrated livestock industry sprouted
in the 1950s v^hen Don Tyson and a handful of others
perfected the contract poultry system.

Under a typical

contracting system, Tyson would provide the chicks, feed,
medication, and instructions on hov; to raise the chickens.
The farmer was asked to provide the land, ''grov^er house''
and the labor.

At the end of each growing cycle, the
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company v/ould pay the grov/ers a set fee for each chick
produced (Carter, 1994 p,14),
As the contract system took root, fully one third of
the nation's poultry farms disappeared betvv'een 1954 and
1964.

Profits for the contracting companies soared, and

according to Successful Farming magazine's periodic survey
of the largest farms in the country, four out of the five
largest farms specialized in poultry production (Ibid, p.3),
In poultry markets the discovery of significant economies of
scale in both selling and processing, as a result of
technological developments, led to high concentration at the
first-handler level,

This in turn created incentives for

backward integration into production by processors of
broilers and turkeys, and forvv'ard integration into
processing and production by feed suppliers, to insure fullcapacity operation.

A handful of contractors control most

of the poultry production and small or moderate sized
growers have no access to the market (U.S.D.A, 1981. p.61).
Vertical integration streamlined the poultry industry.
Some producers have found a niche within this enterprise as
contractors.

The contracting producer provides the poultry

for giant corporations such as Tyson Foods.

Hov/ever, these

contracts require large capital investments in very
specialized buildings.

Because of the nature of the

contracts many argue that there really are not many choices
for producers because of the large investment in the
buildings (Johnson 1994, p,15).

As Professor Neil Hamilton
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of Drake University explains, ''Contract production makes
farmers employees of their own land, with limited control
over the production or marketing of crops, and little
opportunity to profit from risincf markets'' (Carter 1994,
p . 3 ).
At this point one issue needs to be addressed,

It

v/ould appear that ''bigger is better,'' meaning that these
larger farms will necessarily have lower per unit production
costs.

However, studies conducted by the Department of

Agriculture shov/ that the peak of farming efficiency was
reached on farms that could be tended by one family with
good equipment and only occasional help from hired labor
(Robbins 1985, p.27[A]).
Additionally, one of the reasons that these large farms
appear more efficient is attributable to two factors.
First, because there are so fev^, there is little competition
among them.

l^/ith less competition, they are relatively

immune from the discipline of the free market.

Beyond this

market concentration, these companies have another potential
advantage.

Their sheer size and financial might permits

input suppliers and processors to compete with farms in the
actual production of food, even if they are less efficient
than farmers.

The reason is simple.

They have the

advantage of providing their own inputs and securing their
ov/n markets under favorable terms.

In fact, because they

are engaged in more than one stage of production and
processing of a product firms with market power at one of
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those stages can dominate competition in another stage
(Strange 1988, p.281),
Corporate hog facilities have begun to operate in the
same fashion except that they do not contract for the hogs,
they produce their ov/n,

Since 1980, as a result of vertical

integration, 65 percent of independent hog producers have
gone out of business (Smith 1995, p.18).
The reason processors and suppliers are rapidly moving
into food production is profit.

This profit is especially

attractive v/hen integration limits the risk of loss, as in
contract production,

In poultry and swine contract

production, corporations shift more than half of the
investment in the system-the cost of the facilities-onto
producers.

Contracts typically place the mortality and

environmental risks on producers.

Short-term contracts

allow companies to decrea.,se or end production when profits
drop, v/hile the producer remain responsible for paying the
cost of the facility (Hamilton 1994, p.29).
The beef industry is undergoing a similar transition,
The top five beef packers slaughtered nearly 90 percent of
all fed cattle in 1994.

That's nearly 4 percent more than

1993, and 13 percent more than in 1988.

These top five

include IBP inc., Conagra, Excel, National Beef Packing Co.,
and BeefAmerica Operating Co (Kay 1994, p.9),

An

examination of the top packer, IBP Inc., indicates that it
is the most highly focused in the business.

In May of 1994

it completed its acquisition of a cooked-meats business.

It
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already ov/ns a variety of further-processed ventures.

It is

moving rapidly toward producing nearly all close-trim fresh
beef,

In addition, it has plans to expand its hides

business (Ibid p,9).
It is not only the livestock industry that is
expanding.

Every other aspect of the farming business is

also grov/ing, and some observers have suggested that these
concentrations, too, pose potential problems.

Dan Morgan,

in his book Merchants of Grain, demonstrates that five major
companies control the U, S, grain trade.

An example

demonstrating the power of one of these companies dates back
to 1973,

An Interstate Commerce Commission investigation of

Continental Grain questioned why some small grain elevators
were unable to obtain grain boxcars.

The ICC found that

when Continental Grain shipped grain by railroad cars ''the
costs were passed back to farmers and small elevator
managers, v/ho paid for a transportation shortage that was
not of their making'' (Morgan 1980, p.418),
Despite the many problems associated with the rapid
transformation of the agricultural enterprise, most
indications are that the changes will continue.

Upon

further investigation, more problems have been identified as
a consequence of the further concentration v/ithin
agriculture.
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Ecological ImplicatiQns
Another ramification of the transition from family
farms to industrial agribusiness involves the ecological
costs as'sociated Vv'ith this transformation.

One observer

noted the inevitability of this problem; ''The great irony
is that the technologies that are the most environmentally
destructive are also those that best accommodate industrial
farming systems'' (Strange 1988, p.8).

Industrialized

agriculture can feed large numbers of people using
relatively little human labor to produce high yields on a
relatively small percentage of cropland,

However, this form

of agriculture has a greater overall environmental impact on
the air. soil, and water than any other system in modern
industrialized societies (Miller 1988, p.247).
Industrial agriculture is based on deliberately keeping
ecosystems in early stages of succession, where net primary
productivity of one or a few plant species (such as corn or
v/heat) is high.
vulnerable.

But such simplified ecosystems are highly

A major problem is the continual invasion of

crop fields by unwanted pioneer species....

Weeds, pests,

or disease can wipe out an entire crop unless it is
artificially protected with pesticides, herbicides, and
insecticides (Ibid, p.127),

Consequently, insecticide use

in the United States increased tenfold betv^een 1940 and 1980
(Ibid, p,522),
These large farms also tend to produce more v/ater
pollution, since large scale monoculture farming uses more
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petrochemicals,

According to the Nebraska Department of

Health, eighty-one municipal wells in Nebraska—about one in
five—are near or above tolerable levels of contamination
from nitrate-nitrogen,

The principal sources of nitrate

pollution in groundwater in that state are agricultural
chemicals and livestock wastes (Strange 1988, p.41).

In

lov/a, ''environmental officials reckon that up to half of
that state's municipal water supplies are contaminated Vv-ith
pesticides or other synthetic organic chemicals'' (Bullard,
1986 p.ll).

One facet of this problem results from the

concentration of animals in livestock feedlots: ''manure has
become a waste-disposal problem and a pollutant instead of
the fertilizer resource it was when animals were scattered
widely on thousands of farm' " (Strange 1988,, p. 205 ),

For

example, the hogs produced inside the National Farms'
confinement buildings generate yearly the amount of waste
that would be produced by a city of 250,000 people.
National Farms' system of disposing of the liquid waste by
sprinkling it on the fertile topsoil adjoining the Pawnee
National Grasslands prompted a warning from County health
officials three years ago.

Health officials at that time

detected a steadily increasing nitrite level 48 inches below
the surface (Carter 1994, p.3).
In conjunction with this, the effects of industrial
agriculture upon drinking water is compounded because it is
estimated that only 1% of pesticides applied to crops
reaches the target pests,

The remaining 99% ends up in the
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air, v/ater, and other nontarget organisms, including people.
In 1986 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported
that traces of 17 different pesticides were found in
groundv/ater supplies in 23 states,

Water from almost 1,500

wells in California's Central Valley cannot be used for
drinking, bathing, or cooking because of pesticide
contamination (Miller 1988, p,523).
even greater in the 90s.

The problem has become

The Environmental Protection

Agency cites agriculture as the number one pollutant in a
1992 National Water Quality Inventory.

At issue is

agriculture's contribution to nonpoint-source pollution, the
generic name for rain-driven runoff (Klintberg 1994, p,10),
Additionally it was found that agricultural runoff is the
source of 72 percent of the contaminates in polluted rivers
I'The Ami nis .Tnurnal . 1995 p,50).
A study released by the Environmental Vtorking Group
stated that 14.1 million people routinely drink water
contaminated v/ith five major agricultural pesticides—
atrazine, cyanazine, simazine, alachlor and metolachlor,
The information for the study, which focused on the
midwestern states using these pesticides on their corn and
soybeans, was collected from 20,000 water tests conducted by
the U.S, Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (Cohn, 1994 p.6[A]).
Another problem surfaces v/ithin the context of a
discussion of the petrochemicals so essential to
industrialized agriculture.

Considering that the most vital
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inputs for industrialized agriculture are oil and gas, it is
hard to exaggerate the extent of the continuing dependence
on these fuels to power machinery, to create and distribute
herbicides, insecticides, and pesticides,

In addition, oil

is a primary ingredient of fertilizers used on soils
stressed by repeated planting of the same crops.

It is also

used to dry those crops after harvest, as well as heating
animal factories (Strange 1988, p,221).

Of concern is

possible future shortages of key inputs, such as fossil
fuels and phosphate.

Years of low v/orld oil prices have

invited complacency and low investment in new energy
capacity.

In turn, that makes agriculture vulnerable to an

oil shock similar to the mid-seventies (Tweeten 1994,
p,24[C]).

Moreover there have been many studies estimating

the amounts of world oil reserves and, v/hile, the estimates
vary widely, they agree that oil is a finite resource.
Obviously, then, one of the consequences of the transition
from family farming to industrial agribusiness has been to
put all of the eggs in one basket, so to speak, a basket
based on a finite resource.
Another finite resource that affects agricultural
production is land.

Obviously, land is the most important

component in farming.

Industrialized farming affects the

U.S. land inventory in a number of Vv^ays.

For example, soil

compaction, v/hich results from the use of the heavy
equipment utilized by industrial agribusiness, reduces the
capacity of soil to absorb water, reducing yield and
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increasing erosion due to runoff of rainfall (Strange 1988,
p,204).

Concurrently, the U.S. is also losing the

equivalent of about 3 mi 11 ion acres a year due to soil
degradation, and salt buildup in irrigated soil,

In

conjunction this, the United States has been losing annually
about 3 million more acres of rural land, one-third of its
prime agricultural land, due to the spread of housing
developments, highways, and shopping malls (Miller 1988,
p,21) ,
Clearly, the implications of the continued expansion of
agribusiness carries with it many effects,

Thus, with a

better understanding of these consequences, an obvious
question would be, what does the future hold?

Chapter Six

investigates a number of different possibilities.

CHAPTER SIX
OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Siistainahle Farminn
As a reaction to agricultural production shifting from
family farming to industrial agribusiness, in the United
States, some experts have looked to other countries'
agricultural practices for direction,
countries have implemented
policies.

Many of the V'jorlds'

very different agricultural

For example. Japan has found v/ays to feed its

population without relying on agribusiness,

Vernon Ruttan

demonstrates the differences between United States and
Japanese methods of farming in his book Agricultural
Research Po1icy.

The Japanese have managed to feed their

population, despite a very small amount of agricultural
land, through techniques completely different than those
employed by American agribusiness.

Instead the Japanese

have rejected large industrial agribusiness methods because
they are viewed as inefficient.
A more specific example, in the dairy industry, can be
found in New Zealand.

One efficiency measure is pounds of

milk solids produced per acre or per farmer.

New Zealand

cows give half as much milk as American cows, but one Nev/
Zealand farmer produces twice the number of pounds per man.
A typical Nev/ Zealand dairy consists of a husband-wife team
•that milks 160 cows on 160 acres.

Meanwhile, the American

focus on pounds of milk per cow is achieved by purchasing
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high-pov/ered feed ingredients.

In the end, there are fev/er

cows, fewer farmers, and more money spent on inputs from off
the farm (Lehnert 1994, p.52).
Using techniques from the aforementioned examples, some
American researchers have been focusing their efforts on
different types of agricultural production in the United
States.

Perhaps the most promising possibility is called

sustainable farming.

The goal of sustainable agriculture is

to produce food in ways that can be continued indefinitely.
It usually involves substituting renev/able resources
generated on the farm for purchased nonrenewable resources.
It focuses on reducincj pesticides, chemical fertilizer, and
energy use.

It also makes use of ecological practices such

as crop rotation, landscape management, and livestock waste
management (The Prairie Star 1995, p.26[A]),
In 1995, the results of a $4.5 million seven-state
study about sustainable farming were released by the St,
Paul-based North'west Area Foundation.

Research activities

were conducted by multi-disciplinary teams of academic
researchers at land-grant universities

'orkincj in

Vv

cooperation with farm groups and farmers in Minnesota, Iowa,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Washington, and Oregon,
The study vas coordinated by the Center for Rural Affairs,
Waltill, Nebraska (Ibid, p.24[A]),
According to this largest ever multi-state study,
sustainable farming is better for the environment and can be
economically competitive with conventional agriculture,
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This v/as determined by comparing the economic,
environmental, and social impacts of sustainable agriculture
to conventional agriculture,

Additionally, this emerging

farm management technology can contribute to the economic
revitalization of rural communities while preserving the
environment.

However, the study reports, these potential

benefits v/ill not be realized without changes in policy
(Ibid, p.24[A]).
Among the measurable environmental benefits of
sustainable agriculture are reduced toxins in soil and
water, less erosion, enhanced wildlife habitat, and lowerenergy use,

Instead of relying on purchased inputs,

sustainable farmers rotate crops, recycle plant nutrients
and manure, and plant more soil-burning crops than do
conventional farmers.

They also use more cover crops, strip

crops, contour grass waterv^ays, and field windbreaks to
conserve moisture for crop production and reduce soil
erosion.

As a result these farms use less commercial

fertilizer, pesticides, and energy.
Socioeconomic research conducted as part of the study
indicates that sustainable agriculture can provide new
farming and business opportunities for people in rural
communities.

But to take advantage of many of these

opportunities, local business infrastructure must respond to
the different production and market needs of sustainable
farmers (Ibid, p.24[A]),
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Some of the study's other findings indicated that
sustainable farms are likely to be smaller than conventional
farms, but sustainable farmers are likely to own a greater
portion of the land they farm.

In addition, it was found

that conventional farmers are discouraged from adopting
sustainable agriculture primarily from fear of reduced
yields, more labor, and lower income.

But those who had

converted reported that many of these concerns were reduced
as their experience with sustainable agriculture grev,' (Ibid,
p.26[A]).
During the late 1980s, a Department of Agriculture
study examined a possible transition from conventional to
sustainable agriculture.

The findings indicated that a

widespread shift to sustainable farming would increase net
farm income, lov/er farm debts, reduce soil erosion and
nutrient depletion, meet domestic food needs, reduce oil
imports, and lov/er the environmental impact of agriculture.
However, such a switch would also lead to a sharp reduction
in the sales of fertilizers and pesticides; thus, it vrould
be strongly opposed by the politically pov/erful agricultural
chemical industry (Miller 1988, p,259).
In addition to sustainable farming being touted as a
new direction for agriculture, much has been v/ritten about
organic farming.

This segment of agriculture has posted

sales increases of more than 20 percent a year for six
straight years, making organic farming the fastest growing
segment of the food industry.

The U.S, organic industry
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racked up sales of $2,3 billion in 1994, an all time high.
But organic foods still represent only a tiny-if growingslice of the $600 billion spent annually on food in the
United States (Henkes 1995, p.12).
At this point it might seem that there are some trends
which give hope to potential family farmers.

Although

federal policies offer little, in this regard, there have
been reactions at other levels.

The ensuing segment

explores a number of these responses.

Alternatives Generated by the State and Private Sector
The diminished role of the federal government, in terms
of policies to aid family farmers, has created a vacuum
wherein state and local governments have intervened,
Additionally, in regards to farmland preservation, the U,S,
lacks a clear national policy.

Therefore state and local

governments have stepped in an attempt to protect long-term
interests in farmland and, in some cases, assist potential
family farmers (Nelson, 1992 p,484).
As of 1995, every state has enacted laws which seek to
ease the tax burden on farmers by granting preferred
treatment to agricultural land.

Unfortunately, to expect

differential, property-tax assessment alone to contribute a
great deal to the preservation of farmland has proven unduly
optimistic (Santana, 1995 p.l).
For example, the state of Colorado created a task force
to examine agricultural land conversion and develop
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recommendations for state action.

The commission found that

since 1978. Colorado farmland has declined by 90,000 acres a
year,, equivalent to a path one mile wide and 140 miles long
(Colorado Department of Agriculture, 1995 p,l).
The study Vs^hat 1 i

Ahead for Colorado's AC7 Lands?

recommended many possible courses of action.

On the federal

level, the commission recommended that the federal
government increase incentives for conservation easements.
It was also suggested that expanded assistance be given to
beginning farmers and ranchers (Ibid, p.3),

However with

the passage of the "freedom to farm" bill, Colorado can
novv' expect no help from the federal government,
Yet, there is still hop© at the state level.

Oregon's

statewide land use program is described as the most fully
integrated and comprehensive in the country.
mandatory planning standards.

Oregon has

Agricultural lands must be

preserved and maintained for farm use.

Additionally, soils

classified as I-IV, the top half of a soil scale, have to be
zoned for agricultural use (Santana, 1995 p.3),

Another

facet of Oregon's effort to preserve prime farmland has been
aimed primarily at preventing the occupation of those lands
by hobby farmers (Nelson, 1992 p.473).
The results have been viev/ed favorably.

Data from the

United States Department of Agriculture, in its 1987 Census
of Agriculture, strongly suggests that Oregon's prime
f.armland preservation policies seem to vrork (Ibid, p. 475 ).
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V^/ithin the private sector a new development has
unfolded,, known as a conservation easement,

A conservation

easement is a written agreement between the landowner and a
land trust.

It protects the special features of the

property and places restrictions on certain uses of their
land (primarily subdivision) in exchange for either federal
tax benefits or remuneration.

At the same time, the land

remains in private ov^nership and the land trust assures the
terms of the agreement are followed in perpetuity (Bay, 1996
p . 17 ) .
By 1994, there were over 1,000 land trusts in the
nation, with a growth rate of about one a week.

Using

conser-vation easements primarily, over four million acres of
farmland was protected from development by local trusts
(Ibid, p.17).

Ironically enough, the first local land trust

was established in 1980 in California (Santana, 1995 p,3).
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that private land
trusts, in conjunction v/ith policy changes at the state and
local level, have created some opportunities for aspiring
family farmers.

However, v/hile these developments are

promising, they only affect a small percentage of the
overall farmland inventory.

Unfortunately, at the federal

level, the passage of the 1995 farm bill demonstrates that
there will be no such change in national policy in the
foreseeable future.
At this point the future of the family farm seems
fairly well defined.

The ensuing chapter offers some final
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remarks on the overall standpoint of the family farm in the
late

'entieth century

tVv

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS

The purpose behind writing this thesis was to obtain a
better understanding of the ©vents that have unfolded that
make it almost impossible for younger people to gain entry
into agriculture as an ov/ner/operator.

If previous

generations could become farmers, why v^as entry almost
completely denied to current and future generations?

Of

course the obvious answer v/as because one lacks the
necessary capital to make the investment,

However, people

attempting to gain entry into agriculture in the late
twentieth century do not have the same opportunity as
previous generations dating all the way back to the
Revolutionary era.

Vi/hy had this changed?

In turn it seemed as if a fundamental freedom had been
lost, the freedom to farm.

Previous generations had this

option, future generations do not,
and what did it mean?

Hov/ did this all happen

This thesis set out to answer these

questions,
In order to begin answering the question the focus
turned to the late 1970s,

At that time, agricultural policy

had become the focus of attention as a result of the
deteriorating economic situation many farmers v^ere finding
themselves in.

The federal policies of the mid 1970s sought

to maximize production.

Concurrently the federal gov-ernment

had encouraged farm debt by extending credit at rates lower
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than those found in the private sector.

However, by the

late 1970s, the combination of overproduction and
deteriorating export markets were creating business
conditions disastrous for many farmers,

In response to

this, President Carter commissioned a study to examine this
situation and make recommendations for future policymakers.
Unfortunately, this happened at the end of his Presidency
and Carter v^as unable to implement any of the recommended
poli cy changes,
Hov/ever the one point that the study did make clear v/as
that there was a choice to be made.

Continuing past

programs and policies, largely unchanged, would lead to
massive changes in the structure of agriculture.

It would

lead to a small number of producers, largely corporations,
controlling nearly all agricultural output.

In contrast to

that, implementing new policies, recommended by the report,
v/ould encourage a return to small scale farming in the
•Jeffersonian vision.
President Reagan continued past agricultural policies,
largely without change, until 1986,

For example the PIK

program solved a short term overproduction problem, but it
was the same Depression-born policy of paying farmers not to
produce v/ith a new wrinkle, paying farmers from already
existing commodity stockpiles rather than cash.
At the same time, the high dollar, high interest rate
situation, created by Reagan's deficit spending, spelled
doom for many farmers who had borrowed extensively in the
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19 70s,

Thus farmers, v/ho v/ere encouraged to borrov/ by the

government in the 1970s, were devastated by the economic
situation of the early 1980s,

When Congress implemented

policy changes to react to this predicament, it took a court
order to fore© Agriculture Secretary John Block to comply.
The 1980s drastically altered the face of agriculture,
as predicted in A Time to Choose.

The family farm had

managed to last longer than other decentralized forms of
production, but in the end, that just seemed to make its
demise more sudden,
Following the Reagan years, agricultural policy was not
much of an issue in either the 1988 and 1992 presidential
elections.

Thus, not surprisingly, the trends established

in the 1980s continued largely unchanged.

Farms proceeded

to grow in size and their ov/nership continued to
consolidate.

At the same time, industrial agribusiness

extended its control over agricultural production and
output,
The ramifications of the transition from family farming
to industrial agribusiness are far-reaching and numerous,
Perhaps the most disturbing trend has been the problems
associated with the chemicals considered essential to
industrial agribusiness.

The fertilizers, insecticides,

herbicides, and pesticides have contributed mightily to
nonpoint source pollution.

Not only are these chemicals

being discovered in well water, they have also been found in
streams and rivers.

Because megafarms rely on larger and

76

larger machinery to till their ever-growing farms, the
dependence on these petroleum based chemicals to control
unwanted pests and weeds has grown as well,

Furthermore,

the huge machinery and associated petrochemicals all are
dependent on the finite resource oil.
The livestock industry faces similar issues.

Huge

feedlots for cattle, giant barns for chickens, and enormous
hog operations have all created additional concerns.

The

tremendous amounts of animal v/aste create odor problems for
surrounding neighbors.

Furthermore, water pollution, both

in groundwater and streams, has plagued these entities.
An even greater concern involves the soil essential to
all agriculture.

Industrial agribusiness farming methods

are the most conducive to soil erosion.

By using the

farming methods employed by agribusiness, soil is
ef fectively being mined,

Obviously this can only go on for

so long.
At the same time, government policy has exacerbated
this situation,

In the 1930s soil erosion was a top

priority and government policy encouraged farmers to adopt
tillage techniques to prevent it.

In the 1970s these

procedures were discarded as government policy changed to
encourage maximum production.

Then, in the 1980s, soil

erosion rates once again became a concern and the CRP v/as
implemented to eliminate farming on land v^rith high soil
erosion rates.

Now in the 19 90s, the CRP has been abandoned

and federal policy encourages production, once again, on
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land just recently taken out of cultivation.

Of course what

the future holds is a mystery, since v/ith the passage of the
1995 farm bill the government will no longer be involved in
agriculture as of 2002,
Another outgrowth of the transition from family farming
to industrial agribusiness evolved as well.

Borrowing from

the model established in the poultry sector, the cattle,
hog, and grain industries have all come to be dominated by a
handful of corporations.

Documented extensively in A Time

to Choose. the backward and forward integration in the
poultry trade, by these corporations, has been reported to
be occurring in these other industries as v^ell ,
Concurrently, the cattle markets are being investigated to
determine if laws concerning monopolies have been violated.
Additionally, the effects, predicted in a number of
studies

have been demonstrated concerning rural poverty.

The overall economic impact of the industrialization of
agriculture has been felt by both individuals and
communities.

The .Jeffersonian landowner/farmer has been

replaced by a lovv' wage hourly employee who has little hope
of owning a farm.

At the same time, the communities

formerly made up of small farmers have slowly dissipated in
conjunction with the disappearance of the former landowners,
Meanv^hile, there have been a number of reactions to the
transition from family farming to industrial agribusiness.
One of these developments involves what has con^e to be
called sustainable farming,

Sustainable farming offers many
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ansv/ers to the problems associated v/ith industrial
agr ibusiness.

These farms tend to be smaller, v/holly or

partially owned by the farmer, and resource conserving,
They rely on less of the petrochemicals so essential to
industrial agribusiness, and, in turn, do not suffer from
the associated problems.

The farming methods rely on

rotating crops and other traditional techniques which have
been shown to be soil conserving, instead of erosive.
Additionally, the researchers found that these farms
contribute to the economic revitalization of rural
communi ties,
Organic farming is another option to industrial
agribusiness.

Representing the fastest growing segment in

agriculture, these farms have much in common with
sustainable farms.

They tend to be small, owner-operated,

resource conserving operations

However both organic farms

and sustainable farms would need substantial assistance in
the form of redirected agricultural policy to begin to
compete for a major share of overall agricultural output.
Unfortunately, the 1995 farm bill did not provide this
support,
Yet there has been a small ray of hope for family
farmers.

It has appeared in the private sector as well as

at the state and local government level,

Either through

state land-use planning laws, or conservation easements,
some farmland has been preserved.

Because the land cannot

be developed, it is not likely to attain a value greater
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than can be paid for it by being farmed.

Consequently,

potential family farmers can buy these properties and have a
reasonable chance of making it,

Obviously, corporations can

compete for these lands as well, but often the easements, or
state laws, favor the family farmer.
Thus, it seems fair to conclude that at the federal
level the Jeffersonian model of a country founded on the
not ion of the yeoman farmer has reached it's demise.

During

Jefferson's time he warned the nevv' American republic against
the unequal distribution of land.

.Jefferson argued that

''the consequences of this enormous inequality producing so
much misery to the bulk of mankind, legislators cannot
invent too many

devices for subdividing property'' (Strange

1388, p.274 ).
In contrast to that, federal policy nov/ resembles the
policy Jefferson forewarned against.

Perhaps the most

pov/erful observation concerning agricultural policy comes
from farmers themselves:

''In effect, the farm community is

admitting that if farm policies were designed to preserve
the mid-sized operator—that ''family farmer'' v/ho has been
central to the American experience since Thomas Jefferson's
time—it has failed'' (Margolis 1994, p,l[A]),

REFERENCES

Books
Berry, Wendell. 1977, The Unsettling of America. Culture
and Agriculture. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books,
Brodie, Favm M. 1974. Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate
History, New York: W.W, Norton and Company.
Gussow, Joan. 1981. Progress as if Survival Mattered
Francisco: Friends of the Earth.

San

Miller. G. Tyler Jr. 1988, Living in the Environment.
Belmont, California: Wadsv/orth Publishing Company,
Morgan. Dan,
Books.

1979,

Merchants of Grain.

New York:

Penguin

Phillips, Kevin, 1990. Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth
and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath.
New York: Harper Perennial.
Pisani, Donald J. 1984. From the Family Farm to
Agribusiness. Berkeley: university of California
Press.
Ruttan, Vernon W.
Minneapolis:

1982, Anricultural Research Policv.
University of Minnesota Press.

Strange, Marty, 1988.
Vision• Lincoln:

Family Farming: A New Economic
University of Nebraska Press,

Worster, Donald E, 1979. Dust Bowl:The Southern Plains in
the 1930s, New York: Oxford University Press,
Magazine Articles
Bay, Lisa, 1996, Development vvhoas: Conservation Easements
Contracts for the Future. Hontana Magazine,
Mar ch/Apr i1, 12.
Carter, Dave. 1994
Corporate Farms are not the Answer for
Producers or Consumers. The Prairie Star. October,14,
Clark, Richard T., Johnson, James B. and Amosson, Stephen H.
1994. Evolution of the CP:.P. Montana Farmer . August,
14 ,
Cabbage, Steve. 1994. The Business of Politics,
Landhandler, Fa11/Wi n t er, 10,

80

81

. 1994, 10 Years Later: CRP Comes to the
Crossroads, Field Hand, Summer. 18.
Epperson, .James E. , Jordan, Jeffrey 1. , and Variyam,
Jayachandran N, 1990. Preferences of Citizens for
Agricultural Policies: Evidence from a National
Survey. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
May, 259.
Farm Journal. 1995,
January, 32.
.

1995.

Farm Programs aren't Vtelfare.

The Stat Rack,

October, 26,

Hamilton. Neil, 1994. Agriculture V>/ithout Farmers.
Successful Farming. April. 29.
Henkes, Rollie, 1995, Identity-Preserved Production is on
the Rise, The Furrow. MovemJier 12
Horstmeier, Greg D. 1994, Recropping the CRP.
Journal. July/August, 12,

Farm

Johnson, James B., Zidack, wait E., and Stauber, M. Steve.
1996, Management Options for CRP Contracts, Ranchland
Review. May, 21.
Johnson, Paul VL
1995, Stev/ardship Ethic Heals Broken
Land. Farm Journal. January, 22,
Johnson, Charles.
June, 15.
Kay, Steve.
9,

1994.

1994,

Ruffled Feathers,

Killing for Profit

Klintberg, Patricia Peak, 1994.
Reef Today October. 10
Kohl, David. 1993,
April, 6.

Farm Journal.

Beef Today, October,

Water law Changes Fade.

Mega Trends of Agriculture,

Yields.

Landhandler. 1994. Farm Population Depends on Whose
Figures You Use, Fal 1/V'^inter , 2,
Lehnert, Richard,

1994,

Grazing,

Small Farm. October, 52,

Mooney, Rick. 1994, Why CRP is a Steal for Taxpayers
Farm Journal , March, 2 8.
Nelson, Arthur C, 1992, Preserving Prime Farmland in the
Face of Urbanization. Amer.i can Planning Assoniation
Journal. Autumn, 467.

82

Rannhland Review. 1996.
to Me? August, 7 .
Rightmire, Chuck.
Agriculture.

V'^hat does the 1995 Farm Bill mean

1994 Statistics tell Story of Changing
Agri-Mews. December, 1.

Santana, Hernadez Al, 1995, The Protection of Farmland: A
Growing Opportuni ty for Private Land Trusts. The Back
Forty. July/August.
Smith, Barrel. 1995. Can Pigs and People live in Peace?
Farm .Journal. October, 18.
Stevens, Andrew.

1996.

The Amicus Journal.
50 .
The Furro'tf.
30,

1995.

Government is not the Answer.

1995.

Farming for the Future.

1985-1994 Recovery and Hope.

Summer,

.January,

The Prairie Star. 1995. Impacts of Sustainable Agriculture
Documented in Mew Seven State Study. January, 26.
. 1995. 1992 Census Illustrates Declining Count of
Farms. January. 37.
Tweeten, Luther, 1994. Agriculture in the 21st Century
will be Profitable. The Prairie Star. December, 24.
Nev/spaper Articles
Berry, Wendell. 1985. Stockman the Plowman
Times. 26 February, 27 [A].
Bovard, James.
Times. 9

1986. Stop Coddling Farmers.
February, 23 [A].

Mew York
New York

Boyd, Gerald M. 1985. Farmers are in Severe Financial
Distress. New York Times. 24 February, 26 [A],
Brasher, Phillip. 1996. CRP Overhaul Would put Millions of
acres back into Production. Gre.at Falls Trihiine
19
September, 1.
Breimyer, Harold F, 1984. The Biggest Enemy is Mounting
Debt. Nev/ York Times. 30 December. 2 fC) ,
Brown, Robert A. 1983. U.S. Farm Supports; Rev/ards for
Bigness. New York Times. 10 February. 30 (A).
Bullard, Charles. 1986. Half of Cities' Vtater Tainted by
Pesticides. Pes Moines Register. 17 September, 4

83

Carpenter, Cy, 1985, It is the Middle-Level Farnilv Farm
That Needs Federal Help. Mew York Times. 29 March, 34
[D] .
Cohn, f'leredith, 1994, V>/ater Threat Downplayed.
Service. 19 October. 6 [A].
Farnsworth, Clyde H,
Reagan Figures.

State News

1985. U.S. Farm debt Report Disputes
Mew York Times. 11 March, 15 [A].

Kilborn, Peter T. 1984 Farm Price System may be Curtailed,
Vteshington Says. Nev/ York Times. 4 December. 4 [A].
.
1984, U.S. Weighs new Farm Program v/ith
Reduced Government Role, Mev^? York Times. 30 December,
1 [A] .
. 1985. Should Farmers Bear Share of Budget Cuts?
Nev/ York Times .
16 Novem.ber 9 (A)
King, Seth S.
Frailty.

1983. Formidable Farm Bloc Shows Some
New York Times. 8 December. 1 [A] .

.
1984. Farmers Told to Rely Less on Government
Subsidy and More on Markets. New York Times. 3
February, 12 [A],
. 19S5, Block '#ins on Farm Subsidies Plan.
York Times. 5 January, 1 [A].

New

, 1985. Block Defends Proposal to cut aid to
Farmers. Nev York Times. 7, February. 8 FA].
,
1985. Should Subsidies for Farm Interests be
Removed from the U.S. Budget? New York Times. 13
February, 7 [Al.
.
1985. Middle-Size Farms Endangered, Study Says.
Mew York Times. 20 March, 25 [A].
Lapps. Frances M. 1985. Keeping Them Down on the Farm.
New York Times. 11 March, 19 (A),
Lewis, Robert G. 1983. Farmers in the Noose.
Times. 3 October, 23 [C],

New York

Margolis, Jon. 1994. Small Farmers lose Illusions; A
Bitter Harvest lies Ahead. Chicago Tribune 19
October, 1 [A].
McGrory, Brian. 1996. A Cattleman's Beef.
Record. 16 January, 7 [A].

Independent

84

New York Times. 1983, Underv/riting Man's Ingenuity and
Nature's Shifting Moods, 7 August, 3 [C] .
.

1984.

Erosion Made by Man.

9 January, 16 [A].

_. 1984, Study Says Soil Erosion Could Cause
Famine, 30 September, 20 [A].
, 1985. Farm Subsidies grow like Vteeds.
November, 18 [A].

4

Riemenschneider. Charles, 1985. More Aid Would Not Have
Vtorked, Nev/ York Times, 10 March, 1 (C).
Robbins, Williarti. 1981, The Block Farm; A Cabinet Member's
Roots. Nevi? York Times. 18 April. 1 [A1 .
. 1983. Some Farmers Thriving as Others go
Under, Nev/ York Times. 19 February, 1 [C] ,
,
1983, Costly Farm Price Supports are
Under
Sharper Scrutiny, New York Times. 5. December 1 [A],
.
1985. Policies That Have Contributed to the
Farm Crisis. New York Times. 26 February, 20 [A],
.
1985. Farm Bill:Short of Goals.
Times. 29 November, 16 [B],

New York

.
1985, Farm Experts see a Future of Fewer and
Larger Tracts, Nevr' York Times, 17 February, 1 [A],
Schneider, Keith. 1985, Congress Votes Sweeping Change in
Government Support for Farms, Nev/ York Times, 19
December, 1 [A],
Shenon, Phillip, 1985. Congress Divided over Farm Policy.
New York Times. 14 May, 11 [A],
Government Publications
Baquet, Alan E, 1997, Agricultural Forecast, Morphing
Montana, Bureau of Business and Economic Research,
School of Business University of Montana, Missoula MT,
Colorado Department of Agriculture, 1995, V'lhat Lies Ahead
State of Colorado, Denver CO.
Krause, K, R, 19 83,
Incentives, and State Restrictions, U,
Agriculture. Washington D.C.

Department of

85

Lin, William, Coffman, George, and Penn, J.B, 1980. IL
Farm Numbers. Sizes. Related Structural nimenffion<q
Projections to Year 2000. USDA Technical Bulletin no
16 25, Washington D.C.
U.S. Congress. 1986. Technology, Public Policy, and the
Changing Structure of American Agriculture, Office of
Technology Assessment. Washington D.C.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1981. A Time to Choose:
Summary Report on the Structure of Anriru1tnre.
Washington D.C.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1984. P>acKnrourid for 1985
Farm Legislation. Economic Research Service
465. Washinqton D.C.

